

## Chapter Seven



### Liberia's First Civil War 1989-1997



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### NPFL INVASION: DECEMBER 24, 1989

On December 24, 1989, Charles Taylor led the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) in an invasion of Liberia, thus beginning a civil war that would last more than seven years. After experiencing a decade of Doe's military regime and the failure of the 1985 elections to create real change, many Liberians supported Taylor's plan to oust Doe.<sup>1</sup> The brutality that followed the 1985 attempted coup, however, foreshadowed the civil unrest that would accompany Doe's ouster.<sup>2</sup> One statement giver described his realization that a Taylor regime would not seek change for the greater public good, but merely perpetuate yet another despot's self-interest:

That day we witnessed someone who was begging for his life on his knees. Three rebels pushed him to the edge of the bush and then opened fire on him. That was what turned me against Charles Taylor, because I realized he was not about fighting for us.<sup>3</sup>

The first civil war unleashed a torrent of egregious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. Fighting forces engaged in exceptional brutality against combatants and civilians alike. Deliberate targeting of and disregard for civilians were widespread and included the staging

#### **Human rights and humanitarian law violations reported during Liberia's First Civil War:**

Violence to life, health, and physical or mental well-being  
Collective punishments  
Taking of hostages  
Outrages upon personal dignity  
Enslavement  
Acts of terrorism  
Forced displacement  
Looting and pillaging  
Summary executions  
Threats  
Attacks against civilians  
Attacks against humanitarian aid workers and medical personnel  
Violation of the right to security of person  
Forced labor  
Extermination  
Persecution against any identifiable group  
Freedom of movement

of battles in highly populated areas, attacks on unarmed civilians, widespread rape and sexual violence, hostage-taking and similar tactics designed to terrorize the population, interruption of food supplies to civilians, looting, and extremely brutal violence. These atrocities resulted in massive numbers of internally displaced people and refugees and in tremendous suffering by virtually all Liberians who remained within the country. One statement giver summarized, "I observed and heard a rebel say 'I want to see blood.' He took a man, cut his throat and then pulled out his intestine and stretched it like a gate and then cut off his head and put it on a tree."<sup>4</sup>

The extreme violence that characterized the conflict was not the result of isolated incidents involving a few rogue fighters. Rather, these were deliberately brutal

methods condoned, encouraged, or even directed by the faction leaders. Taylor reportedly told one statement giver's brother, "this was a war, and that the boys are trained to kill, even if they killed his mother."<sup>5</sup> A former combatant stated that Taylor would use media broadcasts to instruct the rebels, "everybody loot, take anything you see."<sup>6</sup> Coupled with the poor training and lack of discipline among fighters,<sup>7</sup> such direction encouraged a culture of unchecked violence.

## Human Rights and Humanitarian Abuses in Greater Liberia

In the few months following the 1989 invasion, the NPFL fought its way from Nimba County to the Port of Buchanan, thus bisecting the country.<sup>8</sup> With the Doe government-controlled northwest and southeast unable to coordinate, Charles Taylor was quickly able to take over the majority of the country,<sup>9</sup> with the exception of Monrovia. By April 1990, 90 percent of Liberia was under NPFL control.<sup>10</sup> This territory, known as Greater Liberia, remained primarily under NPFL rule for most of the first civil war. Taylor governed Greater Liberia from the town of Gbarnga.<sup>11</sup>

"Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria." *Art. 3(1), Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.*

The period from the initial invasion in December 1989, until a peacekeeping force was deployed in August 1990 marked an intense episode of fighting, killings, and other human rights violations.<sup>12</sup> During this time, both rebel factions and government forces were responsible for the deaths of thousands of civilians.<sup>13</sup> As Taylor's NPFL sought to gain control over territory and the Doe government sought to repress it, civilians became both the collateral damage and intended targets of opposing forces.

## Forced Displacement

Those living within Greater Liberia, particularly Nimba County, experienced particularly intense fighting and hardship as the NPFL pushed forward its offensive. The insurgency resulted in massive displacement, and it is estimated that approximately half of Liberia's population was displaced in 1990.<sup>14</sup> While in many cases Liberians fled to escape the fighting, in other cases they fled after their family members had been killed and homes destroyed.<sup>15</sup> A statement giver living in Grand Gedeh described how she and her brother's family fled after rebels attacked them in 1990:

My sister-in-law was pregnant at the time and the rebels cut her open to see the sex of the baby...At the time of the fighting after my sister-in-law was killed, I was beat and hit on the back of the head – knocked unconscious.

My brother went missing at that time. I have not heard from him since that day – 18 years ago. My brother had two kids, and I recall one of the kids was shot in the head...My Aunt's son (cousin) was an adult and killed by the rebels. Everyone ran for their lives at this time and went to Côte d'Ivoire.<sup>16</sup>

In some cases, rebels used forced displacement as a technique to clear the area for their occupation. Statements reveal how combatants displaced entire villages by forcing residents to march long distances from home.<sup>17</sup> One statement giver described how Taylor's rebels captured his hometown in 1991 and forced one hundred men to walk all night from Tubmanburg to Kakata, a distance of nearly 40 miles.<sup>18</sup> Another statement giver summarized his experience:

[NPFL] rebels [took] me to the Catholic church in Plibo along with approximately fifty to one hundred other people, including some friends of mine. After I was taken to the church, the rebels burned my house down. They also burned a number of other houses within Plibo. The rebel soldiers forced the people taken to the Catholic Church in Plibo, who were essentially prisoners (and were not free to leave), to walk to Mmalu, another village in Plibo district, approximately 18-20 miles from Plibo. It took us about two days to walk to Mmalu. The rebel soldiers walked behind us, but did not mistreat us.<sup>19</sup>

"1. The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons related to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand. Should such displacements have to be carried out, all possible measures shall be taken in order that the civilian population may be received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition.

2. Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons connected with the conflict."  
*Art. 17, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Protocol II.*

### Food as a Weapon of War

The NPFL offensive resulted in food shortage, particularly in the early years of the war.<sup>20</sup> The insurgency drove farmers off their lands, leaving some crops in the ground and other fields unplanted.<sup>21</sup> One statement giver described how Taylor forced people to join the conflict by threatening to cut off food supplies if they did not participate.<sup>22</sup> He stated that Taylor told a group of displaced people that, if they joined him, they would "get food; if not, no food."<sup>23</sup> Another statement giver stated that child soldiers refused to let them harvest food because of their belief that the villagers, especially older women, would turn into feline spirits at night and harm the rebels.<sup>24</sup> Water deprivation was

“Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited. It is therefore prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless for that purpose, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population such as food-stuffs, agricultural areas for the production of food-stuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works.”  
*Art. 14, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts.*

another significant concern.<sup>25</sup> Some statements indicate that lack of food and water was not merely a side effect, but a deliberate tactic used to kill people through such deprivation.<sup>26</sup> Statements revealed accounts of combatants contaminating water supplies by throwing corpses into wells or streams.<sup>27</sup> The shortages that ensued drove more people to become refugees. The combination of forced displacement and scarcity of food and water resulted in thousands of deaths from malnutrition and sickness.<sup>28</sup>

## Widespread Looting

Rebel factions did not have central supplies and so pillaged basic necessities for sustenance.<sup>29</sup> A statement giver reported that fighters regularly participated in organized raids against civilians called “food attacks” or “clothes attacks” whenever they found their supplies were getting low.<sup>30</sup> Charles Taylor reportedly not only tolerated such conduct but even encouraged his troops to engage in it.<sup>31</sup> A former soldier who fought for the NPFL in the early years of the war summarized:

Food was scarce, so the NPFL orders were to collect rice and meat from villages they captured. Those protesting the taking of their property were killed or otherwise harmed. Usually, we would raid a village and ask the chief for food. If he said no, we would tie the chief up.<sup>32</sup>

Civilians unable to provide food for rebels often faced brutal consequences. One statement giver described the death of his brother after rebels demanded livestock from him in 1990:

When the NPFL forces arrived in the village, they asked him to provide them with cows, goats, and sheep. He could not provide what was demanded of him. He was killed because he could not provide what the NPFL rebels wanted.<sup>33</sup>

The pillaging and extortions were representative of the pervasive lack of discipline among rebels. Rebels did not restrict themselves to basic necessities. One statement giver stated that the rebels would “steal any and everything they could get their hands on inside of the homes,” even taking her wedding albums.<sup>34</sup>

Pillage and threats to commit pillage are prohibited “at any time and in any place whatsoever” during non-international armed conflicts. *Art. 4(2)(g)-(h), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts.*

Another statement giver described the full extent to which NPFL rebels pillaged:

Rebels attacked the village, ransacking houses, killing village people, stealing property and then setting light to the houses. I was a trained midwife: the rebels even took my medical equipment and supplies...As my house had been destroyed, my family was forced to live in one room of the house. I was left with nothing: my house was burned; my possessions stolen; and my crops were burned.<sup>35</sup>

The “taking of hostages” and threats thereof are prohibited “at any time and in any place whatsoever” during non-international armed conflicts. *Art. 4(2) (c), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts.*

Several statement givers described how rebels abducted them or a family member in exchange for ransom.<sup>36</sup> One statement giver described how Taylor’s rebels abducted her stepfather, forcing the family to pay \$10,000 for his return.<sup>37</sup> Another statement giver described how NPFL rebels accused him of being on a reconnaissance mission when he was actually just foraging for food.<sup>38</sup> The rebels kept him in a jail in Seclepea until his father paid \$1,500 Liberian dollars for his release.<sup>39</sup>

### Restrictions on Movement

The NPFL subjected residents of Greater Liberia to a myriad of restrictions on their movement and privacy during the first few years of the war.<sup>40</sup> Travel restrictions and checkpoints were prevalent in NPFL territory. NPFL fighters enjoyed wide freedom of movement and could visit Monrovia;<sup>41</sup> civilians, by contrast, needed to obtain a pass from G-2 (Taylor’s intelligence and administrative center) to travel within NPFL territory.<sup>42</sup> One statement giver described how dangerous it was to travel for both men and women.<sup>43</sup> A rebel group would draft a man into combat or kill him; women would be at risk of attack and rape when they ventured out alone or with children to find food and firewood.<sup>44</sup>

Checkpoints provided combatants a means to target, extort, abuse, and terrorize individuals.<sup>45</sup> Many people reported that rebels demanded their clothes, food, money, other property, or certain behavior at border crossings and checkpoints as the “price” of gaining passage without harm. One statement giver described a checkpoint





where there was “a wall running with blood.” She said people coming through the checkpoint were ordered to drink from the pool of blood, and “if you don’t drink the blood, they kill you.”<sup>46</sup>

Even outside of checkpoints, people were still at risk while moving through the countryside. Another statement giver described how NPFL rebels intercepted her and her family en route to Côte d’Ivoire.<sup>47</sup> The rebels forced her to watch as they cut off her husband’s ears, then forced him to eat them before killing him.<sup>48</sup>

“Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement...” *Art. 12(1), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.*

### Targeting Civilian Populations

In addition to hardship and displacement, the warfare resulted in massive civilian fatalities. Although civilians were sometimes caught in random crossfire between the factions,<sup>49</sup> civilians often were the victims of deliberate, targeted killing based on their ethnicity or perceived support for a faction or the government.<sup>50</sup> The Doe government targeted residents of Nimba County, particularly the Mano and Gio for their rebel support.<sup>51</sup> In turn, the rebel factions targeted Doe supporters, many of whom were Krahn and Mandingo.<sup>52</sup> While ethnic affiliation had been used to discriminate or favor during Americo-Liberian rule, it now served as the basis to kill, torture, rape, or otherwise punish people.<sup>53</sup>

Violence to life and to person, hostage-taking, outrages upon personal dignity, and extrajudicial executions carried out against “persons taking no active part in the hostilities” are prohibited at all times and places. Such protected persons are to be treated humanely “without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.” *Art. 3(1), Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.*

### Targeting NDPL Affiliation

The NPFL’s intentions to target specific groups became apparent early in the conflict. A statement giver described the NPFL’s targeting in Greater Liberia a few months after the 1989 invasion:

NPFL rebels occupied Bong Mines between February and March 1990. They targeted Krahns, Mandingos, and members/officials of the Samuel K. Doe government. A group of NPFL rebels entered the home of our next door neighbor and pulled him from behind the wardrobe where he was hiding. He was taken outside and shot dead. The victim was M.Q. He was the first Krahn man that was killed in our part of the concession area.<sup>54</sup>



Many statement givers reported that NPFL rebels targeted them because of their past or present employment in either the Doe administration or the Tolbert administration.<sup>55</sup> Others stated the rebels targeted them because of their membership in the NDPL, Doe's political party.<sup>56</sup> A person's affiliation with a group need not have been close for perpetrators to target him or her. Individuals who had long ended their employment with the government appear to have been targeted as aggressively as current employees. One statement giver described such a targeted attack:

A cousin of my father was branded as the one who initiated President Doe into the Poro Society Fraternity. Because of this, he was skinned alive by the rebels. They did not kill him first. They began by cutting his face and then peeled away his skin. By the time they got to his knees, he just died. His crime was his association with the president.<sup>57</sup>

Some statement givers suggested that even having an education or good employment could render one susceptible to NPFL targeting.<sup>58</sup>

### **Targeting Ethnic and Tribal Groups**

Rebels frequently targeted people of the Mandingo ethnicity. Reasons for targeting Mandingos varied and included the misperception that Mandingos were "foreigners," had too much wealth, or were too closely associated with the Doe government.<sup>59</sup> Membership in a particular ethnic group superseded nationality, and the NPFL targeted Guineans and Malian Mandingos.<sup>60</sup> One Mandingo statement giver summarized his and his family's experience at the hands of NPFL rebels as they fled in their truck in March 1990:

[A]fter proclaiming that they were there to liberate the country, [the rebels] asked to which tribe my father belonged. When I replied that he was Mandingo, they said, "You come down." I complied and the rebels started beating me up. My sister started crying. When the rebels accused me of being a Mandingo too, I denied that I was and also denied that I had any relation with my father. Rather, I alleged that my sister and I were just getting a ride. But the rebels said, "We can't believe this story." They offered to let my sister go but insisted that "you join us." I was then beaten and tortured by the NPFL...I overheard a young rebel say, "We killed that old man." I never laid eyes on my father again.<sup>61</sup>

Mandingo, Krahn, Gio and Mano, which are commonly mentioned in historical accounts of the conflict as targeted groups, were not the only ones identified as the victims of ethnically motivated atrocities. Statement givers also gave accounts of abuse perpetrated against civilians because they

were Kru, Sarpo, Lorma, or Bassa during the first and second civil wars.<sup>62</sup> The reasons why these groups may have been targeted are less well-documented. One statement giver said rebels targeted Lorma tribe members because the Vice President was Lorma,<sup>63</sup> and others stated rebels targeted Sarpo because of the close connection between Sarpo and Krahn.<sup>64</sup> At times, however, ethnic loyalties were unclear, blurring the motivation behind persecution. For example, while one member of the Kru tribe said the Kru were targeted by the Doe government, another member said they were targeted by rebels for past ties with the Doe government.

Statement givers described perpetrators selecting civilians for torture based on very tenuous evidence of the victims' affiliation with a targeted group, evidence that statements revealed was often incorrect. As a result, virtually no one was safe because the risk of being mistaken as the enemy of any combatant was so high. Indeed, statements suggest that some combatants simply attributed group affiliation to their victims as an excuse to engage in random killing. As one statement giver noted "the rebels would kill people for working for the government even if the victims didn't really work for the government... Just killing because they want to kill, that's how I feel."<sup>65</sup>

Body markings often played a significant role in the identification of government soldiers. Statement givers reported that rebels targeted civilians at checkpoints because they had marks on their legs that appeared to be boot marks, sufficient evidence that the victim was a soldier.<sup>66</sup> Rebels similarly claimed they could tell a person was a soldier from the "residual smell" of a soldier's uniform.<sup>67</sup> One statement giver stated that rebels assumed he was a soldier because he had a gunshot wound.<sup>68</sup> Even the appearance of being healthy or wealthy could cause rebels to pull a person out of a checkpoint line and kill him on the assumption he must be a soldier or government loyalist.

"All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, are entitled to respect for their person, honour and convictions and religious practices. They shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction." *Art. 4(1), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts.*

Body marks consistent with membership in secret societies might mean the difference between torture or freedom at checkpoints.<sup>69</sup> One statement giver said she was targeted as Mandingo because she had a mark on her forehead.<sup>70</sup> The rebels claimed the mark proved she was Muslim because it resulted from praying prostrate.<sup>71</sup> A Lorma woman who was accused of being Mandingo said she proved she was Lorma by showing her captors a mark on her back that she had received during a Lorma secret society rite.<sup>72</sup> She said one of the rebels accused her of being Muslim anyway, as a justification for taking her as a bush wife.<sup>73</sup>

The NPFL used a variety of means to locate and identify target groups. Checkpoints, home invasions, village raids, and even organized searches of the bush enabled combatants to seek out and persecute

targeted individuals.<sup>74</sup> Checkpoints were a common place to pull people out of line.<sup>75</sup> Statements revealed how rebels forced civilians at checkpoints to speak their own tribal languages to prove they were not Krahn, and how those identified as Krahn were pulled out of the line and killed.<sup>76</sup> Illegal entries into civilians' homes were another means of singling out people. Some statement givers related accounts of rebels arriving at their homes and demanding that the "Krahn dogs" come out, or shouting insults such as "You're a Krahn woman – we smell you," immediately before torturing them.<sup>77</sup> Rebels also used informants to identify their targets. One statement giver described how Gio and Mano villagers in the Bong Mines area marked residents' houses before the rebels arrived.<sup>78</sup>

The NPFL not only aggressively sought out people, but they used deceptive tactics to lure people and facilitate massacres.<sup>79</sup> One statement recounted how rebels had deceived the villagers in a town

"The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited." *Art. 13(2), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts.*

in Grand Gedeh County by claiming they came to "discuss peace." Instead, they massacred more than fifty people, including the town chief.<sup>80</sup> Survivors told another statement giver of a massacre in Youkorway-Old Town in 1990.<sup>81</sup> The townspeople had gathered for a soccer game and were awaiting the arrival of an opposing team from the neighboring town.<sup>82</sup> Dancing and singing as if they were the neighboring townspeople, NPFL rebels approached and began firing on the crowd at random, killing both Krahn and Gio people.<sup>83</sup>

In many cases, rebels carried out summary executions predicated solely on ethnicity or government affiliation.<sup>84</sup>

Other statements revealed how the NPFL arrested targeted individuals who were often not seen again. One Nimba County resident described the early atrocities by NPFL rebels in her hometown:

Suddenly one day, NPFL occupied Karnplay in the morning of January 1, 1990. The rebels began arresting officials of Doe's government amidst much shooting. Business people and people who had money were seized and taken away by the fighters. Then the shooting ceased. My mother told me later that my father who was Treasurer of the Woto Farmers Cooperative was taken away by the rebels. My father never came back and I have not seen him since.<sup>85</sup>

Other family members who happened to be present were subject to punishment as well. One statement giver summarized how the NPFL punished her father, brother, and sister because her father supported Doe. "A group took my father and said he was a Doe supporter, and he was beheaded with a power saw and I was stabbed in my stomach with a bayonet from the back. They burnt my brother with

plastic and my sister's fingers were broken.”<sup>86</sup>

The killings were often preceded by multiple forms of violence. It was not uncommon for rebels to commit torture, mutilation, rapes, beatings, and other cruel treatment before or in the course of the murder. One form of torture commonly reported by statement givers was that of “tabay.” Several statement givers witnessed or were subjected to this practice, which involves tying a person with his hands behind his back so tightly that his chest protrudes—sometimes to the point of breaking the chest cavity.<sup>87</sup> Tabay was occasionally followed by stabbing the victim's chest with a bayonet and causing it to explode.<sup>88</sup>

Rebels often psychologically tortured victims, forcing them to sing, dance, or cheer while witnessing the rape, torture, or killing of their loved ones or themselves.<sup>89</sup> One victim described the layers of violence used by NPFL rebels when they targeted her father, a superintendent in Bomi County:

The men told the father to dance and the townspeople to sing. There were two sisters and two brothers there, also stripped. They told the children to dance too. They told the father to drink dirty water...The rebels shot the father many times and started cutting the sisters and brothers to pieces with cutlasses.<sup>90</sup>

### The Armed Forces of Liberia Response

As the NPFL insurgency progressed, Doe directed the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) to respond with violence in both Greater Liberia and Monrovia. Government forces engaged in a violent campaign throughout the country, committing widespread killings in Monrovia,<sup>91</sup> as well as indiscriminately shooting unarmed people in several villages, looting possessions, and burning homes.<sup>92</sup> Liberians, particularly residents of Nimba County, were targeted for suspected opposition activity or ethnic affiliation. Statements reveal that government forces deliberately sought out and persecuted Mano, Gio, Americo-Liberians, and other suspected rebel supporters.

“[O]utrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form or indecent assault” and any threats thereof are prohibited “at any time and in any place whatsoever” during non-international armed conflicts. *Art. 4(2)(e), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts.*

States Parties are “to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction” civil and political rights, “without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” *Art 2(1), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.*

One statement giver described how AFL soldiers came looking for his father, an outspoken critic of the Doe government, in Nimba County in early 1990.<sup>93</sup> They shot up the house, stole his father's clerical robes, and burned down the home.<sup>94</sup> "They made threatening statements for my father, saying, 'Doe told us to come and get your head. Come out and say what you've been preaching. We're going to take your head out on a platter.'"<sup>95</sup>

One statement giver described how AFL soldiers maintained blacklists of targeted people. The statement giver described how an AFL soldier dropped a list while searching his home.<sup>96</sup> When the statement giver picked up the list, he saw it contained the names of various individuals, including his father. Next to each individual's name was written "and family." Some of the names on the list had been crossed off.<sup>97</sup> That night, the AFL soldiers killed his father, mother, and sister.<sup>98</sup>

Often, however, government soldiers failed to ascertain affiliations, thus casting a wide net that often encompassed more than the targeted groups. One statement giver summarized Doe's sweeping violence in Nimba County after the invasion:

The news of the killings started coming to Monrovia and President Doe sent the AFL up to Nimba County to confront Taylor's forces. The problem was that the AFL couldn't tell rebel from civilian. Taylor's forces would be housed in with families and sometimes civilians would set traps for AFL soldiers by offering them hospitality and then ambushing them. So, the AFL started killing everyone and the word spread that the Doe army was targeting Gio people.<sup>99</sup>

Simply wearing the wrong color, bearing body markings, or other arbitrary reasons subjected persons to suspicion by government forces. One statement giver said the police mistook his parents for rebels and killed them simply because they had not fled sooner.<sup>100</sup> Another statement giver described the problems he faced as a result of a skull-and-crossbones tattoo on his body.<sup>101</sup> Because rebels used a similar symbol, soldiers stopped him at a checkpoint, stripped him naked, and forced him to walk through the city at the point of a bayonet.<sup>102</sup> Although he had obtained the tattoo for fun upon his graduation, it caused him a great deal of trouble over the next several years, and he was subject to questioning several times.<sup>103</sup>

Another statement giver described how his brother was mistaken for a rebel by Doe's AFL soldiers:

Collective punishments and threats thereof are prohibited "at any time and in any place whatsoever" during non-international armed conflicts. *Art. 4(2) (b), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts.* Protected persons include those who are not taking a direct part in or those who are no longer taking part in hostilities. *Id.* at Art. 4(1)

If you are a man and wear a red T-shirt and jean pants, they felt that was the rebel uniform and you were killed. They killed my brother-in-law. He had on jean pants. He liked to wear them. He did not know the AFL were looking for pants that color. The AFL were of President Doe's tribe. They shot my brother-in-law. He drove a taxi.<sup>104</sup>

Government attempts to identify suspected rebels heightened the risks of traveling, and one statement giver described how perilous it was to move through the country at this time. He stated, "If you lived in another town and were going to Monrovia, you might reach there by the grace of God. The Liberian Army will kill you."<sup>105</sup>

In Monrovia, as in Greater Liberia, the Doe government continued its sweep. In January and February 1990, the government made hundreds of warrantless arrests of Gio and Mano males.<sup>106</sup> A statement giver living in Monrovia described witnessing AFL soldiers seizing Gio and Mano people in the spring of 1990: "Day and night, I saw Krahn soldiers of the AFL take away civilians of the Gio and Mano ethnic groups. These people were my neighbors who never came back after they were taken/carried away."<sup>107</sup> The detentions were often coupled with the disappearances or killings of NPFL supporters, Gio, and Mano people.<sup>108</sup> A Gio government inspector described seeing numerous corpses when AFL soldiers arrested him and took him to their barracks in 1990:

"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law."  
*Art. 9(1), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.*

When I entered inside, I saw a lot of dead bodies -- hundreds. I could not recognize any of them. There were wounded people without any medical attention. On March 7, they sent a grader to bury the people, right behind the barracks. The grader covered them with soil.<sup>109</sup>

## **RISE OF THE INDEPENDENT NATIONAL PATRIOTIC FRONT OF LIBERIA (INPFL)**

The hostilities between Charles Taylor's NPFL and Doe's AFL were soon exacerbated by the rise of another fighting faction. In July 1990, a split developed between Taylor and a group of NPFL fighters led by Prince Johnson.<sup>110</sup> Prince Johnson launched a splinter group known as the INPFL, comprised of approximately 500 combatants.<sup>111</sup> The INPFL gained control of areas in Monrovia<sup>112</sup> and established its base in the city's outskirts at Caldwell. The rise of the INPFL increased the risks to civilians, as they not only became subject to violations by fighters in INPFL territory, but also could be suspected of association with yet another faction.

Charles Taylor's response to the splinter was particularly oppressive. One statement giver described Taylor's reaction as follows:

Furious with Johnson's betrayal, Taylor's occupation of [Monrovia] was a "reign of terror." He called everyone out of their homes, and made everyone walk single file and stand in a line. All men were stripped naked so that Taylor's men could search for the marks that most of Johnson's followers bore...When Taylor and his men discovered "defectors," they would gather all civilians to watch while the person was forced to his knees and shot in the back of the head...Once Taylor had taken control of Bong Mines, civilian men were forced to report daily to "G-2 offices" to receive clearance to go to the market or move freely in town. The clearance consisted of a pass that was meant to show that one was not a threat.<sup>113</sup>

The INPFL, and notably its leader, demonstrated a capacity to carry out egregious atrocities against both targeted populations and random victims. Like its NPFL forerunner, the INPFL targeted Krahn, Mandingo, government affiliates, and NDPL members. INPFL also attacked homes and accosted people in public.

One statement giver recalled how Prince Johnson and his men came to his house looking for his father, a soldier in Doe's army:

We lived in Monrovia, Vaitown before the war started in 1990. During the war when Prince Johnson's INPFL took control of that area we left there with our father and mother. Prince Johnson and boys entered the area and [were] shown to our house by some people who knew we were Krahn and that my father was in the army at the time. Mr. Johnson and his boys entered our yard and started cursing and asking "Where are the Krahn dogs that are living here?"<sup>114</sup>

When his father came out of hiding, the rebels looted the family's belongings, set the house on fire, and beat the statement giver's father for information about his friends and family before shooting him in the head.<sup>115</sup> Overall, the situation was so dangerous that it was risky even to look for food because, in the words of the statement-giver, the "INPFL would kill you if they saw you."<sup>116</sup> Attempts to resist INPFL abuses resulted in death or other violence.<sup>117</sup>

Numerous statements describe the atrocities condoned or committed directly by Prince Johnson.<sup>118</sup> Statement givers reported how Prince Johnson stood by and watched his fighters commit atrocities. For example, following the Doe assassination, a Krahn woman reported that she sought to flee



Those responsible for the detention of persons, who are deprived of their liberty for reasons associated with armed conflict, shall seek to respect, within the limits of their capabilities, that their “physical or mental health and integrity shall not be endangered by any unjustified act or omission...” *Art. 5(2)(e), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts.*

Monrovia on an ECOMOG ship. Prince Johnson and his men boarded the ship where the refugees were waiting. Prince Johnson reportedly sat in a chair on top of a table, playing a guitar and singing, while his soldiers randomly killed people. The statement giver said she overheard Prince Johnson state, “Take them to the base. Feel free, this is Liberia, anyone can be your president and the next morning you will be executed.”<sup>119</sup>

Other statement givers related how Prince Johnson played a direct role in perpetrating violations, either by carrying out the atrocities himself or ordering his fighters to do so. A statement giver described how INPFL rebels beat his father so severely he could no longer speak, at which point Prince Johnson took out a pistol, shot his father in the head, and left.<sup>120</sup> One statement giver described how in July 1990 Prince Johnson sought revenge against his father for winning a lawsuit against him:

Prince Johnson and his men came to our house and asked us out. He told my father that his time was finished. He ordered his men to beat my father after he wounded me on my head [and I was] on the ground bleeding. They beat my father to death. That day Prince Johnson was dressed in blue jeans with a red t-shirt--written on it “Freedom Fighter.” After my father was killed, I was ordered to go to the Caldwell base with them.<sup>121</sup>

The INPFL often arrested and detained people at Caldwell, where they would be tortured, sometimes to the point of death.<sup>122</sup> Statement givers described the atrocities that took place at the INPFL base, including “manhandling of people; severe torture; summary executions.”<sup>123</sup> One Krahn statement giver was forcibly conscripted and taken to Caldwell base where he was trained to fight.<sup>124</sup> The statement giver described the conditions and treatment he experienced at Caldwell:

Persons detained due to reasons associated with the armed conflict shall “to the same extent as the local civilian population, be provided with food and drinking water and be afforded safeguards as regards health and hygiene and protection against the rigours of the climate and the dangers of the armed conflict...” *Art. 5(1)(b), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts.*

We were arrested by the INPFL and taken on their base. I personally was tortured because of tribal affiliation. I was kept in prison for about 6 days without food. I only survived on mere rain water. While in the process of

having us executed, Prince Johnson gave the order to have us released.<sup>125</sup>

While the INPFL targeted specific groups, it also demonstrated the same greed, lack of discipline, and depravity that characterized other armed factions. In addition to taking revenge, INPFL rebels often extorted money from the civilian population. One statement giver described how the INPFL in 1990 demanded money from his family, who were prosperous and worked for the government:

On that fateful cool morning, Prince Johnson and his INPFL attacked our home. At dawn, [they] ordered our entire family out in single file: father, mother, brothers and sister. They ordered my father to surrender his financial assets, but he told them that he had no money with [him that] instant. They (rebels about 8 in number) pushed him six feet and shot [him] in the head and chest. My mother ran on top of his body. She was shot from the back twice. [W]hen my brother and sister ran to their bodies, they too were shot at close range.<sup>126</sup>

Combatants are prohibited, at all times and places, from committing “violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds” against persons not taking part in the hostilities. *Art. 3(1)(a), Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.*

### FIRST BATTLE FOR MONROVIA: JULY 1990

By summer 1990, Monrovia remained an area of contention among warring factions. Doe, while still in office, was losing his ability to administer the country and enforce the rule of law.<sup>127</sup> The INPFL commanded various areas of Monrovia, as well as Bushrod Island.<sup>128</sup> Taylor controlled large, key parts of Liberia, but Monrovia still remained outside of NPFL control. As different forces sought to acquire or retain control of the capital, intense fighting around Monrovia surged during battles in 1990, 1992, and 1996. These three battles afforded factions not only the opportunity to seize Monrovia, but also the chance for opportunists to plunder and take revenge.<sup>129</sup>

One statement giver described the atmosphere leading up to the first battle for Monrovia as “tense” because “[t]he rebels were coming; nobody knew when.”<sup>130</sup> Another statement giver described how, in April 1990, people heard rumors that rebels were approaching Monrovia.<sup>131</sup> Businesses began to shut down, some government officials fled the country, and food became increasingly scarce.<sup>132</sup> While there were rumors that the rebels and the AFL were fighting in nearby neighborhoods, there were no confirmations on either of the two radio stations.<sup>133</sup> Some Liberians who had education and employment at stake took notice of the impending crisis. One statement giver, who was a high school student living with his brother, a physician, described the growing realization that it was necessary to leave:

We didn't want to leave Monrovia. We hoped that they would just go away, but it soon became obvious that there would be no school and no work in Monrovia. Like everyone else, we decided to leave. It was June 1990.<sup>134</sup>

In July 1990, the NPFL launched what would be the first of three major battles for Monrovia. Some Liberians simply could not believe the rebels would ever advance to Monrovia and the attack took them by surprise.<sup>135</sup> One statement giver, a charcoal seller in the market, described the unexpected alarm and chaos that ensued:

The NPFL war came in 1990. I was at the market and didn't even know it was coming. People came and started beating people. I hid behind coal. They grabbed M. and killed her right there and then they started looking for me. I went to my house to find my husband but he had been killed. I started running when someone grabbed and beat me. I was wounded in the stomach and fainted in a gutter.<sup>136</sup>

Parties to the conflict are prohibited at all times and places from committing "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment" against persons taking no part in the hostilities.  
*Art. 3(1)(c), Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.*

Numerous statement givers gave eyewitness accounts of atrocities committed by both rebels and government soldiers as they fought for control of the capital. The statements again reveal the multiple forms of violence and the targeting of certain groups and ethnicities. An NDPL youth wing leader summarized an INPFL attack based on NPFL and Mandingo affiliations in Duala:

They (INPFL) started going on a house to house...[W]ithin that instant, my boss lady, M.M., whom I was assistant to, was arrested, tortured, beaten, raped and she was subsequently executed (beheaded). My husband, M.K., a Mandingo by nationality, was a businessman. He was arrested and executed. Realizing that my life was at stake, I decided to run away with my two kids, but I was caught by the rebel. They started to beat me with the gun butt. I was stabbed with the soldier knife in my stomach and lost consciousness. So they thought I was dead, so they left me.<sup>137</sup>

Another statement giver, whose father worked for President Doe, described how rebels broke into their house in July 1990.<sup>138</sup> The men tied the statement giver's father's wrists behind his back and told him he was enjoying money from President Doe and always drinking wine with Doe. A fighter threatened to hit the statement giver for crying and then stabbed him in the stomach with a knife and rammed the butt of a gun on his foot.<sup>139</sup>

The men made my father stare at the sun...The men took me and my father to an unfinished block house. The men continued beating and torturing both of us. They beat us with wire and the butts of their guns. The men told us we had spoiled the country and ate the money. I was on the ground, hurt and crying hard. Another rebel came and said that my father was Doe's campaign manager and that they needed to kill him. They forced my father to drink urine from a cup and said it was wine. My father tried to spit it out and they continued to beat him by hitting him on the back of his neck with the butts of their guns. Another man hit me because I was crying and I passed out. When I came to, others told me that the men had shot and killed my father...<sup>140</sup>

AFL soldiers were equally ruthless in their attempts to defeat the rebels. The atrocities were often misdirected or senseless and they resulted in the loss of numerous innocent lives. For example, one statement giver described how the AFL shot indiscriminately, opening fire on everyone at the supermarket in July 1990.<sup>141</sup> As the INPFL approached, the AFL retreated, slaughtering many people as it did so.<sup>142</sup> One statement giver summarized how a group of AFL soldiers transporting a wounded man ordered him and his family into the bush:



The entire family (my birth mother, stepfather, sister and me) ran into the bush where we were followed by some of the soldiers that were on the trucks. The wounded man was now being held up by two of the soldiers. A soldier pointed to the wounded man and angrily said to me and my family, "You are responsible for this. We are going to kill all of you." I was frightened as the man put shot in the rifle and was pointing it at my mother. The bullet went in between my mother and sister and hit a man standing slightly behind and in between the two of them. The man fell and died instantly. As the man reloaded the gun my family and I were frozen in terror. Once he reloaded the gun, he raised it towards me and said, "You, I am going to kill YOU." I shook as the soldier kept trying to squeeze the trigger but the trigger or something on the gun had become jammed. The soldiers then took all of our food.<sup>143</sup>

The terroristic impact of the killings was magnified by mutilation and other inappropriate treatment of the bodies.<sup>144</sup> One statement giver described finding the bodies of his family after they were murdered by AFL soldiers on July 30, 1990:

My father's body was terribly mutilated. My mother's stomach was ripped open. She was eight months pregnant. I was so frightened I couldn't even touch them. My sister had been shot right in the middle of her head. I was in a terrible state. I couldn't even look at them closer because I was just in shock. I mean even to see my father was hard. I could just recognize him by his watch which was still on his hand.<sup>145</sup>

*"The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited." Art. 13 (2), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts.*

One of the most egregious examples of government atrocities was the St. Peter Lutheran Church massacre in July 1990. AFL soldiers and Doe loyalists killed hundreds of people who had sought refuge in the church from the war.<sup>146</sup> One statement giver lost seven family members in the Lutheran Church massacre.<sup>147</sup> According to accounts, the soldiers were deliberate and comprehensive in the executions. As one Liberian stated, "the soldiers were shooting to kill."<sup>148</sup> A public hearings witness described one survivor's account of how the entire room was filled with sleeping people when heavy shooting began.<sup>149</sup> The troops came upstairs to the classrooms and opened fire on people.<sup>150</sup> With no time to flee, people lay flat, but the soldiers walked over them and shot them as they lay there.<sup>151</sup> Those who tried to escape were gunned down.<sup>152</sup> One statement giver explained how women in the church tied babies to their backs, and as they fled, the soldier shot their backs, killing them and the babies.<sup>153</sup> The disregard for the church as a safe haven magnified the horror for many civilians. Another statement giver stated, "imagine trying to seek refuge in the church, a house of God, and they opened fire."<sup>154</sup> Statement givers who witnessed the aftermath of the incident, or knew survivors, confirmed the massacre accounts.<sup>155</sup> One of them recalled the aftermath:

*"[A]ll possible measures shall be taken... to search for the dead, prevent their being despoiled, and decently dispose of them." Art. 8, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts.*

[It was] a horrible sight. There was blood all over the place. People had been killed by bullets in their heads. There was blood all over the walls and the floors. There was a mass grave that was dug. It broke my heart to know Liberians were killing other Liberians.<sup>156</sup>

The few individuals who did survive were saved by chance or by their ethnicity. One person survived only because another body had fallen on top of her, shielding her from the soldiers' view.<sup>157</sup> During public hearings, one witness testified how the aforementioned Liberian survived. When the soldiers began shooting, she screamed in Grebo, "Please don't kill me among these dogs tonight, please don't kill me."<sup>158</sup> When the soldiers heard her, they stopped shooting and asked, "What are you doing among these dogs? We're going to kill up the whole church and you are among them?"<sup>159</sup> The witness summarized what happened next:

And so they told her they were going to kill everybody, but because these – the two of them were Grebo, according to her, they wouldn't kill them. But they had to figure out a way. So she said the Krahn soldiers said they needed to slash her, because they needed to spill blood from everybody that night. That was the rule. So they slash her. And they slash her friend. And she had two kids. And they said, "We're going to take some bodies and lay them around you. Lie flat, and we'll put some dead bodies around you so it looks like you [sic] dead and because all through the night there will be inspections to make sure everybody is dead."<sup>160</sup>

Like so many other horrific events, the St. Peter Lutheran Church massacre was a trigger that compelled many Liberians to flee the country.<sup>161</sup>

Statements reveal that combatants from all factions, besides targeting and killing groups, abused their power to loot and to seek revenge during the battle for Monrovia. As in the preceding months, soldiers and rebels demanded food, money, or other goods. One statement giver described how, in early July 1990, he witnessed NPFL soldiers confiscate food and the clothes off of people's backs.<sup>162</sup> Another described how rebels dressed as women and wearing weave caps came to his home and ordered him to catch his family's chickens for them to eat.<sup>163</sup> The rebels ordered him and his family to leave while they prepared a meal for themselves and took "everything they wanted from the property."<sup>164</sup> When victims could not meet fighters' demands, they were often punished. AFL soldiers asked one statement giver's father for food and money, then killed him because he could not give them either.<sup>165</sup> One statement giver summarized an INPFL fighter's retaliatory treatment of him over his father's failure to pay him:

"It is prohibited to order that there shall be no survivors." *Art. 4(1), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (1977).*

It was July 1990. It happened in Jimmycar Road, Bushrod Island, Monrovia. It was a Prince Johnson boy [who] identified [himself] as Henry. He was dressed in an INPFL rebel uniform. He first slapped me in [my] mouth with



his bare hand and because of that, my three teeth came out from my mouth. He said he committed the act because he worked for my late father, G.A., and that my father did not pay him. He alerted me under Bong Mine Bridge and asked me for my name. I told him my name and he later said, “I work for your dirty father and he did not pay me.” He told me to give him six feet, but I refused to go back so he slapped me on my mouth.<sup>166</sup>

Families became separated and displaced as civilians were taken away or fled.<sup>167</sup> Both males and females were susceptible to being abducted as statements indicate they were taken away to become bush wives, laborers, or combatants. One statement giver summarized the abduction of his sister and aunt by NPFL rebels:

The next day, as we were making our way to the Soul Clinic, we were approached by a group of Charles Taylor’s rebels in trucks, who were looking for “wives.” They proceeded to abduct my sister (15 years old) and my aunt (17 years old). I was horrified and devastated to see them taking my sister and aunt away while I and my parents stood by watching helplessly. I had heard by word of mouth what happened to women and girls that were abducted.<sup>168</sup>

The statement giver himself ended up being abducted by rebels and forced into manual labor, along with other children, at the Old Soda Factory.<sup>169</sup> Another statement giver described how rebels came to their home and killed his father, a government employee.<sup>170</sup> His mother, sisters, and brothers fled in different directions, and the statement giver has not seen any family members since that day.<sup>171</sup>

During their flight from the battle, Liberians were subject to additional abuses.<sup>172</sup> One statement giver described his experience during the siege:

“No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.” *Art. 8(3)(a), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.*

During the first week in July 1990, when Taylor attacked Monrovia, my mother, six brothers and I sought to flee to Kakata by way of the Fendell campus. As we were walking, we were detained by Taylor’s militia...[The leaders] directed militia members to beat my older brother. My brother was also subjected to tabay and was killed in front of my eyes. The following day my mother instructed me to proceed without her and to flee with my five younger brothers. As my brothers and I resumed walking, we were again detained by Taylor’s militia. The militia cut one of my young brothers then shot all of them dead -- only I was spared.<sup>173</sup>

Later, the statement giver learned that his mother had also been killed.<sup>174</sup>



## DEPLOYMENT OF ECOMOG

By the time the first battle for Monrovia began, a regional response mechanism to the conflict was already in process. The government's rapid loss of control, the rising state of anarchy, and faction leaders' control over certain areas<sup>175</sup> compelled Doe to make an appeal for international assistance in May 1990.<sup>176</sup> In response, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) created a military intervention force on August 7, 1990, to send to Liberia.<sup>177</sup> Composed of approximately 3,500 troops from Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and the Gambia, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) mission arrived in Monrovia on August 24, 1990.<sup>178</sup> The largest contribution and greatest number of forces came from Nigeria.<sup>179</sup>

**Nigeria** pursued a dominant role in West Africa on many fronts, including the establishment of ECOWAS and the maintenance of regional order.<sup>180</sup> For example, Nigeria was the largest supporter of the ECOMOG mission to Liberia, contributing nearly \$50,000,000 and most of the troop support for the initial deployment of the ECOMOG peacekeeping force.<sup>181</sup> Following the execution of Doe when Ghanaian General Arnold Quainoo was in charge of the mission,<sup>182</sup> ECOMOG adopted the provision that a Nigerian would always hold the position of ECOMOG Field Commander.<sup>183</sup> Nigeria's influence in Liberia continued to grow even stronger, and by 1994 about 7,000 of the 11,000 ECOMOG troops were Nigerian.<sup>184</sup>

Scholars recognize that Nigeria had several interests in quelling the instability in Liberia. Because it saw the Liberian conflict as a threat to the region's economic and military stability, Nigeria sought to restore order. It also believed that dissidents from Nigeria and neighboring countries had trained in Libya with Taylor and NPFL forces with the idea that Taylor would support their rebellions in their countries if he succeeded in Liberia.<sup>185</sup> Nigeria's perception that intervention was necessary was intensified by the rebels' attacks on the Nigerian embassy in Monrovia, the UN mission, and Nigerian and other ECOWAS citizens, including the August 1990 massacre by the NPFL of hundreds of Nigerian citizens inside the Nigerian embassy.<sup>186</sup>

Finally, Nigeria was motivated to act from a desire to support Doe and to prevent Taylor from succeeding in his rebellion.<sup>187</sup> The president of Nigeria, General Ibrahim Babangida, who had come to power through a military coup in 1985, was a friend and ally of Doe.<sup>188</sup> While Nigeria's motives for intervening in Liberia are complex, it is also likely that the personal relationship between Gen. Babangida and Doe played a role. Indeed, Doe made his May 1990 appeal for assistance directly to Gen. Babangida (and President Eyadema of Togo) rather than to ECOWAS.<sup>189</sup>

ECOMOG's primary purpose was to ensure compliance with peace and ceasefire agreements.<sup>190</sup> A gap between ECOMOG's articulated mandate and the actual needs of the situation soon became apparent.<sup>191</sup> Thus, absent an effective police force and the need for political intervention, ECOMOG, the regional force, became involved in responsibilities beyond peacekeeping.<sup>192</sup> Throughout its seven-year deployment, other responsibilities that ECOMOG assumed included mediation between warring factions,<sup>193</sup> helping establish the Interim National Government,<sup>194</sup> the implementation of ECOWAS-

brokered peace accords,<sup>195</sup> disarmament, safeguarding aid supplies, sheltering troops,<sup>196</sup> helping supervise the 1997 elections,<sup>197</sup> and promoting security by helping to rebuild Liberia's military, police, and security forces.<sup>198</sup>

The regional forces successfully repelled the NPFL invasion.<sup>199</sup> Nevertheless, political undercurrents and inadequate planning, logistics, and lack of equipment hindered ECOMOG's initial efficacy.<sup>200</sup> Preexisting regional political tensions led to division among ECOWAS members.<sup>201</sup> With the exception of Guinea, the Francophone nations (led by Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso) supported Taylor and objected to the intervention; the Anglophone countries, including Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Ghana, supported the intervention.<sup>202</sup> Logistical factors, including inadequate force levels, the lack of a Monrovia-based ECOWAS official to facilitate political negotiations, and inconsistent interpretations of the mandate, reduced ECOMOG's effectiveness.<sup>203</sup> Finally, many sources point to concerns about ECOMOG's conduct and neutrality. There were reports of widespread looting by ECOMOG soldiers, alleged sales of weaponry by Nigerians to armed groups, and concerns about Nigeria's support for the Liberia Peace Council (LPC).<sup>204</sup> Its deficiencies were quickly evidenced by its failure to prevent the assassination of President Doe by INPFL forces less than two weeks after its arrival.

Many statement givers, however, described how ECOMOG saved their lives, prevented further human rights abuses, or helped them escape Liberia.<sup>205</sup> Statements also attributed the presence or imminent arrival of ECOMOG forces to lives saved. In numerous cases, statement givers reported how rebel fighters would stop terrorizing them and disperse upon hearing about the impending arrival of ECOMOG troops. One statement giver's description was typical:

Through the intervention of the Almighty God, some ECOMOG soldiers of the multinational peacekeeping force came from the Vai Town area and rescued us when the rebels fled from my area. [The rebels] left us when they got to know that some ECOMOG soldiers were coming to our rescue.<sup>206</sup>

In this way, the presence of ECOMOG played an important role in preventing rebels from committing further human rights violations and humanitarian crimes. Statement givers described how they would call or alert ECOMOG to attacks, prompting them to respond.<sup>207</sup> In addition, ECOMOG frequently provided safe haven at their base for Liberians. Statement givers reported staying on the ECOMOG base for periods of a few days up to two weeks.<sup>208</sup>

In addition to playing an enforcement role, ECOMOG at times assisted with the health and other basic needs of Liberians. Statement givers reported how ECOMOG soldiers often carried them to the hospital<sup>209</sup> or to their base for medical treatment.<sup>210</sup> ECOMOG soldiers gave civilians food,<sup>211</sup> sometimes in exchange for work.<sup>212</sup> ECOMOG also sent ex-combatants to St. Mary's Catholic School in Duala, Liberia to be reintegrated.<sup>213</sup>

Early on, Taylor viewed the ECOMOG intervention as a threat to his objectives and as an adversary.<sup>214</sup> In August 1990, prior to ECOMOG's deployment, Taylor criticized the peacekeeping force, which he considered an act of aggression. He proclaimed he would "fight to the last man," stating, "I've given orders to open fire on any strangers setting foot on our territory."<sup>215</sup> NPFL-controlled radio frequently broadcast anti-ECOMOG messages.<sup>216</sup> The NPFL intended to weaken the political resolve of ECOMOG's member states so that Nigerian and Ghanaian citizens would force their governments to withdraw.<sup>217</sup>

Although it was intended to be a neutral peacekeeping force, ECOMOG soon assumed a more offensive role.<sup>218</sup> As early as October of 1990,<sup>219</sup> violence erupted between ECOMOG and the NPFL<sup>220</sup> as ECOMOG successfully pushed the NPFL out of Monrovia.<sup>221</sup> Violence escalated between the two groups when the NPFL launched "Operation Octopus" in 1992.<sup>222</sup>

"Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law." *Art. 20(1), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.*

Another consequence of Taylor's hostility toward ECOMOG was that foreign nationals became the target of human rights abuses.<sup>223</sup> The NPFL targeted citizens of ECOWAS countries in retaliation for ECOMOG's role in the conflict. Specifically, the NPFL adopted a policy of targeting Nigerian, Ghanaian, and other ECOWAS civilians in retribution for the deployment of ECOMOG.<sup>224</sup> Referring to the ECOMOG force, Taylor reportedly stated that, "for every Liberian that's killed I'm going to make sure some other nationals get killed too."<sup>225</sup> In a widely reported massacre of foreigners, the NPFL killed two hundred ECOWAS nationals in 1990.<sup>226</sup>

"States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination..." *Art. 4, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.*

Nationals of Nigeria, the predominant contributor to the ECOMOG peacekeeping force, were particularly at risk.<sup>227</sup> In referring to Nigerian citizens, Taylor was quoted as saying, "They are not refugees. They are aggressors... They are all going to bear the brunt of this."<sup>228</sup> Rebels also targeted doctors and other civilian aid workers from Nigeria and other ECOWAS nations on a routine basis.<sup>229</sup> Statements also described the targeting of Ghanaians. One statement giver summarized:

There was a big Jeep with Charles Taylor's soldiers, causing cars to stop. A woman was with her husband and their children on the road. My daughter and I were at the creek, brushing our teeth and washing. A soldier got down from the Jeep, stopped the woman and her husband, and asked where

the woman was from. She replied that she was from Ghana and lived in Monrovia. The soldiers took her husband, took off his shirt, tied his hands behind his back. The lady ran to the house for her passport to prove she was from Ghana and came back with it. The soldiers told her, “Look at your husband and say goodbye. You’ll never see him again.” They took him to a little place nearby and shot the man three times...<sup>230</sup>

“Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.” *Art. 20(2), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.*

Later, the statement giver recognized one of the soldiers as her former student.<sup>231</sup> When she asked him what was happening, he told her that ECOMOG had reached Monrovia and that “we’re here to kill all the foreigners.”<sup>232</sup> The statement giver then understood why they killed the man from Ghana.<sup>233</sup>

Another statement giver said he escaped from NPFL forces to their preoccupation with targeting Ghanaian citizens:

Because the ECOMOG troops in Monrovia were from the sub-region, the NPFL was arresting people from the countries that had supplied soldiers. There were two Ghanaian teachers in the town. The NPFL rebels caught them and while they were interrogating them, I was able to sneak away into the bush. I heard two shots as they killed the Ghanaians.<sup>234</sup>

The NPFL adopted other strategies to punish citizens of ECOWAS countries. For example, the NPFL restricted movement for ECOWAS citizens through and out of NPFL territory.<sup>235</sup> Arrest and detention were another means of punishing these citizens. A Human Rights Watch report described large scale-detention facilities in NPFL territory established to hold captured ECOWAS nationals of both military and civilian background.<sup>236</sup> Nigerian journalists claimed that they were hostage targets.<sup>237</sup>

Persons who “find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals” are entitled to protection under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.\* *Art. 4, Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.*

\* “Nationals of a State which is not bound by the Convention are not protected by it. Nationals of a neutral State who find themselves in the territory of a belligerent State, and nationals of a co-belligerent State, shall not be regarded as protected persons while the State of which they are nationals has normal diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they are.” *Id.*

Despite the ECOMOG presence in Monrovia, statements reveal that the INPFL continued to perpetrate violations, including forced labor. One statement giver described how the INPFL attempted to force her to prepare food for them:

From time to time, I was harassed by them always to cook for them. At that time there was widespread insecurity. Based on that fear for me to continue to cook for rebels, I decided not to cook for them anymore. That action made them vexed. As a result, three of the rebels flogged me in the morning of September 5, 1990, just before President Doe was captured on September 9, 1990.<sup>238</sup>

States Parties are to “recognize the right to work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts...” *Art. 6(1), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.*

### Execution of President Samuel K. Doe

In addition to the targeting of its nationals, ECOMOG encountered other early challenges. On September 9, 1990, Prince Johnson and INPFL troops captured Samuel Doe at a meeting brokered by ECOMOG.<sup>239</sup> The rebels assassinated a number of Doe’s supporters and tortured Doe to death, videotaping the event and distributing copies throughout Monrovia.<sup>240</sup> The videotape, which depicts Prince Johnson drinking beer while fighters cut off Doe’s ears, became widely available in Liberia and elsewhere.<sup>241</sup> Doe is seen pleading to be spared before he is killed.<sup>242</sup> A statement giver recalled that day:

I saw a convoy with Samuel Doe in it, wearing a grey suit and in an open-topped car. As I was on the street, watching the convoy cross the bridge, I remember thinking that if Doe crossed the bridge, he would be killed by Prince Johnson...I heard shooting. The shooting lasted for 30 minutes. Then it was very quiet. The next day, as we left, we heard the BBC was reporting that the Liberian President was captured by a Liberian faction and was wounded. I decided it would be too dangerous to leave, and I felt trapped...The next 72 hours were worse. Doe was tortured, with his elbows tied together behind his back...They captured, tortured, mutilated, and murdered Doe on camera.<sup>243</sup>

Statement givers described heightened ECOMOG restrictions on the press immediately following Doe’s murder. One statement giver who reported for the *Torchlight* newspaper recounted how ECOMOG took journalists to see Doe’s body, but refused to allow publication of photographs of

Doe's body for political reasons.<sup>244</sup> Another statement giver described how ECOMOG forced the *Daily Observer* to burn all newspapers that contained pictures relating to Doe's death.<sup>245</sup>

These conditions spawned what would be a series of broken accords throughout the next several years. The period between 1990 and 1992 was described as an "uneasy truce"<sup>246</sup> as peace talks interspersed with fighting took place. In November 1990, ECOWAS attempted to broker peace talks between Taylor and Doe loyalists, and established an interim government to lead Liberia.<sup>247</sup> Amos Sawyer was appointed head of the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU).<sup>248</sup> Monrovia reverted to a relative degree of calm. One statement giver described:

While Sawyer was in control, people were able to move more freely around Monrovia. Prior to Sawyer's control, few people could leave the greater Monrovia area because Prince Johnson had divided it.<sup>249</sup>

The negotiated ceasefire was fragile, however, with bouts of sporadic fighting. Within days, the INPFL violated the peace agreement by launching an attack against the AFL.<sup>250</sup> Fighting between the NPFL and other factions continued in Greater Liberia.<sup>251</sup> Finally, the emergence of new rebel groups threatened the precarious situation.

#### **"OPERATION OCTOPUS": OCTOBER 1992**

On October 15, 1992, NPFL forces launched their second effort to seize Monrovia from ECOMOG forces.<sup>252</sup> On the day after bombings began, one statement giver recalled her school principal announcing that everyone would leave school early that day.<sup>253</sup> She recalled thinking, "Wait a minute, when you said that in 1990, we didn't come back for a long time."<sup>254</sup>

The NPFL's attack, named "Operation Octopus," was illustrative of the widespread violence by multiple factions. One statement giver recounted:

They called it Operation Octopus because it had so many arms, and there were [soldiers/fighters] everywhere, even in the swamps. There were launches [bombings] all the time. They would see people coming out everywhere with blood on their faces.<sup>255</sup>

Operation Octopus lasted approximately one month.<sup>256</sup> Although it was brief, a statement giver classified it as one of the deadliest conflicts: "very short, but more crazy than the previous outbreaks."<sup>257</sup> According to another statement giver, Taylor's mission was to "engulf Monrovia and kill everyone that moved in order to capture Monrovia."<sup>258</sup> By the end of the operation, more than 200,000 people were displaced and approximately 3,000 had been killed.<sup>259</sup> A statement giver summarized the chaos

and intensity during the operation:

We ran to the main street, more than five thousand people on the run again. It was very sad because the rebels were mixed up with civilians, some women were walking naked, some people lost their kids. The rebels were in the midst of the people – some of them had guns in mattresses tied up on their heads.<sup>260</sup>

Statements describe the difficulties of trying to survive amidst the hardship and the warfare. Monrovia experienced severe food and money shortages during Operation Octopus. The operation had the economic impact of devaluing the Liberian currency. One statement giver estimated that the Liberian currency depreciated 85 percent overnight, thus diminishing the means of already impoverished people.<sup>261</sup> Another statement giver summarized the difficult food situation:

[E]veryone “hustled.” You had to sell the food you hustled in order to get more. Rice was like gold dust, money was nothing. We ate rice and beans and small clams from the river that we would boil and suck. We would also eat sugarcane. The custom was to drop the sugarcane after the juice was gone, but then little children would come along and pick it up and continue to suck on it... Food was so scarce that, if people were behind you and saw that your jaw was moving, they would pick up whatever you dropped. We also ate palm butter from the trees but this was difficult because you had to smash the kernel and mash it by hand.<sup>262</sup>

“The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger, shall take, individually and through international co-operation, the measures, including specific programmes, which are needed...” *Art. 11(2), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976).*

Many statements reported fatalities that occurred as a result of crossfire and bombings. One statement giver living on Bushrod Island stated that stray bullets killed at least ten people he knew.<sup>263</sup> Another statement giver recalled that the bullet spray was so intense that his family hid in the bathroom for hours one night.<sup>264</sup> At that time, Prince Johnson also began launching bombs.<sup>265</sup> A statement giver described how his pregnant sister-in-law was hit on the head with a mortar round in Logantown; “she disintegrated and died of the injuries she sustained.”<sup>266</sup>

Statement givers described the strategies they learned to survive Operation Octopus. For example, one statement giver described how people learned to run toward the source of rocket fire after a launch because running away from the rocket’s source might place them directly in its landing path.<sup>267</sup> Also, he recounted how they prayed for night fighting, because bullets were more visible in the dark.<sup>268</sup>



Another statement giver stated that she had to finish her cooking quickly because she cooked outside where there were always stray bullets.<sup>269</sup> The atmosphere was tense. A statement giver summarized how drastically their lifestyles changed during Operation Octopus:

Every night we heard bombing. We stayed at our home. We didn't sleep. We wore jeans and sneakers with undershirts and t-shirts on our heads. We had to be ready to leave at any time. We were always in the hallway and had to stay away from windows.<sup>270</sup>

Operation Octopus lacked the same level of ethnic targeting of the first battle for Monrovia. Both AFL and rebel forces demonstrated more interest in looting and killing regardless of ethnicity.<sup>271</sup> Like the first battle for Monrovia, Operation Octopus afforded opportunities to exploit power. Because NPFL rebels were unpaid they were encouraged to plunder and were promised compensation in the form of loot or even a house.<sup>272</sup> One Liberian statement giver described how a child soldier put his name on their home, stating that Taylor promised any property they captured would be for them.<sup>273</sup> In other cases, the rebels destroyed property. A statement giver described how rebels burned down her home, possessions, and other neighboring houses.<sup>274</sup>

Rebels also used Operation Octopus as a means to exact revenge. Accounts describe how, once again, rebels raped, tortured, and arrested civilians as revenge for past grievances. One statement giver described how she had previously refused to have sex with an NPFL fighter; during Operation Octopus, he came to her house, stabbed her in the knee, and raped her.<sup>275</sup> Another statement giver recounted how an NPFL leader sought revenge because of his expulsion from the statement giver's organization:

He was expelled from his post and disappeared from the township only to resurface in NPFL uniform and well armed. So he was able to get even at me during 'Octopus.' I was taken at their command post at Kakata and put into a cell. I was tortured and beaten on several occasions.<sup>276</sup>

A few statement givers discussed the role of ECOMOG during Operation Octopus. Given the exigencies of the situation, ECOMOG began fighting the NPFL alongside the AFL and the United Liberation Movement for Democracy (ULIMO).<sup>277</sup> While some people blamed ECOMOG for the atrocities, one statement giver conceded that they may have been killing in defense and to protect Monrovia.<sup>278</sup> Another statement giver described the failure of ECOMOG troops to protect civilians during their retreat from New Georgia Estate.<sup>279</sup> After a missile landed and rebels began to approach, Liberians ran toward the ECOMOG troops for protection.<sup>280</sup> Instead of defending the civilians, the Sierra Leonean commander stated that his troops were not going to die for Liberians, and ECOMOG retreated.<sup>281</sup>

A public hearing witness related ECOMOG's use of the media during Operation Octopus. He testified that, as a reporter for the Liberia Broadcasting System, he was compelled to run propaganda for ECOMOG and the IGNU.<sup>282</sup> When the NPFL attacked ECOMOG throughout Monrovia, the Liberia Broadcasting System did not broadcast where Taylor's forces were in the suburbs. Instead, to his regret, Liberia Broadcasting System told people to go home:

“Go back. Mr. Taylor is just giving propaganda. There is no war somewhere. Go back to your various homes. Everything is calm.” When people went there, and they were slaughtered, they were killed by Mr. Taylor during the interim government.<sup>283</sup>

Ultimately, ECOMOG, with the assistance of the AFL and ULIMO, was able to successfully repel the offensive and maintain control of Monrovia.<sup>284</sup> In addition, ECOMOG successfully wrested Kakata and the port of Buchanan from NPFL control,<sup>285</sup> but at the expense of more civilian lives. One statement giver described the ECOMOG bombings around the port:

The right to freedom of expression includes the freedom to “receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds... either orally, in writing or in print...or through any other media of...choice.” *Art. 19(2), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.*

Air bombers came and started to bomb the port in Buchanan. There were also gunships at sea throwing shells at the city. The gunships and bombs were destroying homes. The gunships didn't seem to have targets, but the planes may have had targets at or near the port.<sup>286</sup>

INPFL involvement in the conflict began to decline, and the faction eventually disbanded in October 1992.<sup>287</sup> ECOMOG troops entered Taylor-controlled areas in April, but soon pulled out because of fighting between ULIMO and the NPFL.<sup>288</sup> The NPFL, however, held 580 ECOMOG troops hostage through September 1992.<sup>289</sup> Although former U.S. President Jimmy Carter negotiated their release, the incident heightened the hostility between ECOMOG and NPFL.<sup>290</sup>

At this time, the United Nations stepped up its efforts to stem the warfare, including implementation of a weapons embargo on all factions and the establishment of the U.N. Observer Mission in Liberia.<sup>291</sup> Stockpiles of arms had already grown so large in Greater Liberia, where their movement could not be easily regulated, that the embargo was imposed too late to be truly effective.<sup>292</sup> Also, Liberia's borders remained porous and open to weapons flow because ECOMOG had been unable to position its troops along key points.<sup>293</sup> Thus, fighting and atrocities continued, including an AFL massacre of 547 displaced persons at Harbel, west-central Liberia, in June 1993.<sup>294</sup>

## RISE OF OTHER FACTIONS

The years between 1991 and 1994 saw the emergence of several new armed factions. In late May 1991, a group of former Doe loyalists and AFL officers formed a new rebel group to resist Taylor's forces.<sup>295</sup> ULIMO received support from Guinea and Sierra Leone, as well as initial support from ECOMOG.<sup>296</sup> A former ULIMO combatant described the formation of ULIMO:

The objective of the new group was to fight against Taylor while avoiding the killing of innocent civilians. I joined ULIMO and helped recruit fighters and solicit donations for the organization among the Liberian refugee population in Guinea. I and other militants mobilized boys, girls, men, older people to fight - although, with respect to the recruitment of youngsters... Alhaji [Kromah, the ULIMO leader] couldn't accept children under 18. ULIMO first entered Liberia from Sierra Leone and its early military actions against Taylor's forces were successful. There was fighting in Gbarnga, Taylor's headquarters. Initially, ULIMO combatants were armed only with cutlasses, knives. They soon acquired weapons by "arresting" NPFL forces and seizing their guns.<sup>297</sup>

From 1993 to 1994, a number of events resulted in the rise of other new factions. On July 25, 1993, the AFL, NPFL, and ULIMO signed the Cotonou Agreement.<sup>306</sup> Although the Cotonou Agreement failed within months, it established a new government that included NPFL and ULIMO representatives.<sup>307</sup>

**ULIMO** was formed in Sierra Leone in 1991, with the support of Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Guinea.<sup>298</sup> Sierra Leone and Guinea supported Liberian refugees, primarily Krahn soldiers, in instigating a counteroffensive against the NPFL; this support was a response to the 1991 Revolutionary United Front (RUF) invasion of Sierra Leone which came from bases in NPFL-controlled Liberia.<sup>299</sup> With both countries providing a base, training, weapons, support, and trade in diamonds and other resources, ULIMO emerged as a major adversary to Taylor.<sup>300</sup>

Later, in 1994, ULIMO divided into two factions, one of which was the Mandingo based ULIMO-K headed by Alhaji Kromah.<sup>301</sup> The government of Guinea was closely involved in the factional struggle for the control of ULIMO because of ULIMO's access to diamonds in Sierra Leone. During 1996-97, ULIMO-K surrendered 800,000 rounds of ammunition, more than all of the other factions put together.<sup>302</sup> Additionally, Kromah claimed to have a large contingent of Mandingo fighters in Guinea.<sup>303</sup> ULIMO-K, like other military factions, looted the areas it controlled. After looting, ULIMO-K traded directly across the northern border with Guinean officers, who were often members of ECOMOG.<sup>304</sup> In one example of looting and then trading in Guinea, a car was taken and disassembled in Liberia, reassembled in Guinea, and then sold.<sup>305</sup>

Consequently, the accord not only elevated the NPFL into the political sphere, but also generated new factions, such as the Liberia Peace Council (LPC), that were not bound to the peace negotiations.<sup>308</sup>

In 1993, the LPC was launched.<sup>309</sup> An 800-person-strong, Krahn-dominated group headed by former PRC minister George Boley, the LPC was composed of members of the AFL and Krahn fighters of ULIMO.<sup>310</sup> By October 1993, the LPC had begun fighting the NPFL,<sup>311</sup> wresting from it control over key areas in the southeast.<sup>312</sup> In March 1994, ULIMO split into two factions.<sup>313</sup> The ULIMO-K faction was led by Alhaji Kromah, allied with Guinea, and dominated by members of the Mandingo ethnic group.<sup>314</sup> The ULIMO-J faction was led by Roosevelt Johnson, allied with Sierra Leone, and dominated by members of the Krahn ethnic group.<sup>315</sup> In turn, the Lofa Defense Force (LDF), supported by Taylor, fought ULIMO-K in Lofa County.<sup>316</sup> All sides, including the new factions, reportedly continued to carry out human rights violations.

There were still reports of ECOMOG soldiers committing human rights violations against civilians. One statement giver reported how family members and friends told stories about how ECOMOG troops violated people, raped girls, demanded bribes, and generally “took advantage of their power to treat people poorly.”<sup>317</sup> Sources have described the looting by ECOMOG forces, which was so widespread it led to the joke that ECOMOG stood for “Every Car or Moving Object Gone.”<sup>318</sup> Another statement giver summarized how a Ghanaian ECOMOG soldier commanded her to pick up a wrapper dropped by a child she was accompanying:

When I did not immediately pick it up, he slapped me very hard in the ear. When I spoke back to him, he pointed his gun at my face. People began running in the street. I pushed the soldier and told him to kill me, but he took his gun and left. I could still hear a high pitched noise in my ear as a result of the slap.<sup>319</sup>

There were reports of ECOMOG carrying out summary executions. One statement giver stated that the Senegalese contingent of ECOMOG near Paynesville, a Monrovia suburb, would inspect youths for rebel marks; if they found youth bearing such marks, the soldiers arrested and killed them.<sup>320</sup> These tactics compelled the statement giver to join the NPFL out of fear for his life.<sup>321</sup> Another statement giver witnessed the shooting of a man who took money and food. ECOMOG soldiers first shot him in the foot, felling him, then shot him again.<sup>322</sup> In addition, statement givers stated they witnessed ECOMOG troops humiliating, torturing, and killing rebels whom they had captured and taken into custody.

“No sentence shall be passed and no penalty shall be executed on a person found guilty of an offence except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by a court offering the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality.” *Art. 6(2), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts.*

Statements and secondary sources revealed accounts of ULIMO violations, including summary executions, torture, arrests, looting, the use of child soldiers, and restrictions on freedom of movement.<sup>323</sup> One statement giver reported that, “the ULIMO war in 1993 was the toughest.”<sup>324</sup> She fled for two months in the bush without food, surviving on strained mashed bush yams.<sup>325</sup> Another statement giver described how ULIMO-J fighters broke into his family’s store, stole their money, killed his father, and raped his sister.<sup>326</sup>

Furthermore, ULIMO fighters often crossed over into Guinea where Liberians had sought refuge.<sup>327</sup> One statement giver described how ULIMO soldiers crossed over and grabbed people from the Guinean camp where she stayed in 1993.<sup>328</sup> She began disguising herself as an old woman to avoid abduction.<sup>329</sup> Another statement giver recounted how ULIMO-K fighters brought pictures depicting their tortured captives to a school in Nzerekore, Guinea.<sup>330</sup>



Crossing over into other countries to attack refugees, a violation of international law, was not a practice exclusive to ULIMO. Many statement givers described how other rebel groups had crossed the border and attacked them in refugee camps in Côte d’Ivoire,<sup>331</sup> Guinea,<sup>332</sup> Sierra Leone,<sup>333</sup> or even as far away as Ghana.<sup>334</sup> Those who sought refuge in Côte d’Ivoire were particularly vulnerable. A Krahn statement giver recounted that his home in Côte d’Ivoire was close enough to Liberia that he could see NPFL rebels taunting him from the other side of the

border. In this case, the rebels tried to coax refugees to come back to Liberia.<sup>335</sup> One of the men acquiesced and crossed over to Liberia, whereupon NPFL rebels tied him up and then defecated and urinated on him before burning him alive and dumping his body into the river.<sup>336</sup> The statement giver also described how NPFL rebels crossed over and attacked a group of women, who went to a nearby farm to plant food.<sup>337</sup> He explained:

While the women were planting, Charles Taylor’s rebels crossed the river and slaughtered them. Twenty seven women were killed in all. Their bodies were dismembered. The rebels laid out the body parts in long lines and sold the body parts to other rebels...the rebels sold the hands for 25 cents, the arms for 50 cents and the heads for \$2.00.<sup>338</sup>

Several statement givers described accounts of cannibalism by ULIMO and other factions.<sup>339</sup> One statement giver overheard ULIMO girls describing how a girl was forced to cook human intestines

and heart.<sup>340</sup> She became so traumatized, “she would just sit there and laugh all day.”<sup>341</sup> One woman described how NPFL rebels killed a young boy, cut out his heart, and forced people to eat it.<sup>342</sup> At times, the victims were still alive when their flesh was eaten. A woman said NPFL rebels had cut her hand and drank her blood.<sup>343</sup> Another statement giver said she had seen a rebel commander chew off someone’s thumb.<sup>344</sup> One man provided an explanation for the origins and reasons behind eating human flesh:

The Liberian saying is that when you eat the heart of your enemy, their power transcends to you. These people could extract the heart in a split second, while the victim was still alive, better than surgeons, and eat it raw. It has to be the Burkinabes who trained them to do it, because this was not the Liberian way before the war. None of this ever happened before Charles Taylor’s War of 1990.<sup>345</sup>

The LPC was also responsible for the commission of severe abuses. Statements describe LPC atrocities, including rape,<sup>346</sup> murder,<sup>347</sup> forced recruitment,<sup>348</sup> use of child soldiers,<sup>349</sup> use of drugs,<sup>350</sup> torture,<sup>351</sup> abductions of bush wives,<sup>352</sup> forced labor,<sup>353</sup> and looting.<sup>354</sup> As with other armed groups, the civilian population became the battleground for the LPC. One former LPC combatant recounted:

The LPC said to kill anyone they found because they were paying a debt. When I fought for LPC, the orders were to leave no one standing when we captured a village, so we killed everyone in the village.<sup>355</sup>

Protected persons include those not taking a direct part in or those who are no longer taking part in hostilities. Art. 4(1), *Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts*.

Statements bear out accounts of the LPC’s widespread attacks on civilians, particularly in 1994 and in the southeast. A student living in Harper in 1994 recounted how LPC rebels attacked her school. They beat the teachers, poured gasoline around the school, and threatened to burn it down “from first grade progressing to ninth grade” if the teachers refused to send the students outside. When the teachers let the students out they “ran for their lives,” but LPC rebels killed many people, including the principal.<sup>356</sup>

Like other warring groups, the LPC reportedly perpetrated their attacks using multiple forms of violence. One statement giver described how LPC rebels attacked him and his family in Zwedru in 1994:

One day some men from the LPC came to my house looking for my father, who worked for the government. The men, none of whom were wearing uniforms or carrying guns, raped my mother and sister, murdered my father in front of me, and hurt everyone in my family. Then they took me and my mother away from our house, and made us tote loads for them for two hours until we reached Fishtown. On the road to Fishtown, the rebels who were carrying me slashed a knife into my leg when I asked where they were taking me. To this day, I have a permanent scar on my leg, and cannot work for money because I can't stand for longer than five minutes.<sup>357</sup>

Fighting, albeit at a lower intensity, continued. By August 1994, the Washington Post reported, “[w]hile organized armed confrontation has been relatively light, there is no end in sight to the war...”<sup>358</sup>

#### **AKOSOMBO AGREEMENT: 1994**

On September 12, 1994, three warring factions, the NPFL, ULIMO-K, and AFL, signed the Akosombo Agreement. The accord granted Taylor considerable dispensations, including a seat on the five-person Council of State,<sup>359</sup> much to the displeasure of the Nigerian government.<sup>360</sup> Subsequently, ECOMOG attacked Gbarnga in September 1994. Civilians in Gbarnga found themselves in the midst of fighting and bombings. One statement giver summarized his experience and the long-term injuries he and his child sustained:

During the fighting in Gbarnga in 1994, a rocket exploded in our house resulting in the near shattering of my left leg and the dislocation of my hip bone. I was in a coma when I was taken to the hospital in Abidjan. I stayed at Cocody Hospital in Abidjan for a year and a half. My left leg is presently shorter than my right leg, and I used to walk with crutches occasionally because they cause my left side to pain when I use them for a whole day from place to place. My daughter was also hit the same day. Some of the rocket's particles penetrated her chest; she underwent surgery to have the particles removed. Today, she continues to live in pain, and drinks quite often in a day due to perpetual heart burn. I too live in perpetual pain.<sup>361</sup>

The attack, although unsuccessful, nevertheless demonstrated that Nigeria would not passively accept Taylor's ascent to power.<sup>362</sup>

Various factors, including politico-historical roots, ethnic divisions, and ECOMOG's maneuvering among the armed groups, continued to splinter the factions.<sup>363</sup> Alliances between ECOMOG and other factions proved unstable, leading to severances and attacks between factions and the peacekeeping



force.<sup>364</sup>

For example, ECOMOG and the Nimba Redemption Council (NRC) had discussed plans to launch a second front against the NPFL in early 1993.<sup>365</sup> Upon deployment, the NRC's spokesman issued a statement announcing the formation of the NRC and calling for support for ECOMOG's deployment.<sup>366</sup> To his surprise, however, ECOMOG forces were not deployed alongside the NRC combatants as planned:

It turned out that the ECOMOG soldiers were not in place. It turned out that Nigeria had borne too heavy of burden, and we found [this out] after the fact that Nigeria had borne a heavy burden for the ECOMOG effort in Liberia. And in order for them to deploy the troops, they would have to move a lot of conventional weapons, tanks, artillery from Conakry to Sinkor, which is I believe is about six or seven hundred miles and the road was largely unpaved...So, they made a decision against it, that they were not prepared to commit those resources...I got to find out from the ECOMOG commander...that they didn't attempt to deploy anymore...they are taking the option off the table. And at that point I was really furious and a lot of us were furious because this was not what we signed onto. What we signed onto was to see that the peacekeepers would be deployed with our help to minimize the resistance from the Taylor fighters.<sup>367</sup>



As a result, Taylor had forewarning of the attack, which enabled him to engage in combat and kill eight of the NRC fighters while they waited for the arrival of their ECOMOG allies.<sup>368</sup>

In 1994, division within the NPFL arose, leading Tom Woewiyu, Sam Dokie, and Lavelli Supuwood to form the NPFL-Central Revolutionary Council.<sup>369</sup> By 1995, there were seven different fighting factions, including the NPFL, NPFL-CRC, LDF, ULIMO-K, ULIMO-J, AFL, and LPC.

The exclusion of the newer, non-signatory factions from the Akosombo negotiations remained contentious.<sup>370</sup> Thus, the factions convened to sign two more agreements on December 21, 1994.<sup>371</sup> The Accra Agreement enabled, inter alia, accession to the Akosombo Agreement, a ceasefire to begin midnight of December 28, 1994, and the establishment of a new Council of State composed of five

representatives selected by the various fighting factions.<sup>372</sup>

During this time, hostilities remained widespread throughout 80 percent of the country, but at a lower level of intensity.<sup>373</sup> A U.N. report noted the segmenting of fighting into different territories according to the warring factions. For example, the NPFL and LPC coalition forces primarily battled in the eastern, northern, and to some extent, southern, parts;<sup>374</sup> ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K fought in the western areas;<sup>375</sup> ULIMO-K and the NPFL fought in Lofa County;<sup>376</sup> and ULIMO-J and the NPFL fought in Bong and Margibi Counties.<sup>377</sup> Most fighting consisted of skirmishes, looting, and attacks on infrastructure.<sup>378</sup>

Statements detail atrocities by factions in spite of the relatively lower levels of fighting. A statement giver living in Maryland County described how in 1994 she returned home from the market to find her parents, brothers, and sisters gone.<sup>379</sup> Rebels later captured and raped her.<sup>380</sup> Another man living in Grand Gedeh County described how LPC rebels tried to forcibly recruit him in August 1994; when he refused, the rebels tortured him, stripped him naked, and jailed him for a day.<sup>381</sup> Another statement giver living in Maryland County recounted how she and three other women ran into an ambush of Doe loyalists.<sup>382</sup> One of the rebels raped her; when he finished he called over one of his friends to rape her as well.<sup>383</sup>

Statements also contained reports of attacks against medical personnel and patients during the war.<sup>384</sup> Two incidents in 1994 recounted by statement givers are demonstrative of these humanitarian law violations. A nurse recounted how Taylor's rebels attacked the Bong County hospital and forced the nurses to render services to them.<sup>385</sup> When ULIMO-J forces attacked in 1994, Taylor's rebels reportedly returned to the hospital and "started killing nurses indiscriminately."<sup>386</sup> One woman living in Gbarnga described how Taylor's forces attempted to take over the hospital in 1994:

"Medical and religious personnel shall be respected and protected and shall be granted all available help for the performance of their duties...In the performance of their duties medical personnel may not be required to give priority to any person except on medical grounds." *Art. 9, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (1977).*

Not long after they arrived at the hospital, Taylor's troops attempted to take over the building, but the hospital personnel were able to hold them off. A few hours later, Taylor's troops came back with reinforcement, and made everyone in the hospital come outside with their hands over their heads in a line. They treated invalids, the elderly, and hospital staff with equally brutal force. Everyone sat on the ground for hours, while Taylor's men shot

randomly at patients. I saw the body of my former doctor and my former reverend lying on the ground.<sup>387</sup>

### **ABUJA I: AUGUST 1995 AND THE APRIL 6, 1996 WAR**

On August 19, 1995, warring parties reached the thirteenth peace agreement, Abuja I.<sup>388</sup> The agreement provided for a new Council of State, disarmament, and elections.<sup>389</sup> On September 1, 1995, a collective transitional government known as the Liberian National Transitional Government II (LNTG II), headed by Taylor, Alhaji Kromah, George Boley, and three civilian representatives, came into power.<sup>390</sup> By bringing factional opponents into the political realm, the Abuja agreement ushered in political strategy as another means to gain control of the country.<sup>391</sup> Notably, ULIMO-J was excluded from direct participation in the Abuja peace negotiations.<sup>392</sup> Although the agreement included a provision granting ULIMO-J's Roosevelt Johnson a head position at the Ministry of Rural Development,<sup>393</sup> the exclusion of his faction from negotiations and the implicit failure to recognize ULIMO-J as a major force within the conflict likely served to alienate Johnson and ULIMO-J from the final terms of the Abuja accord. The outcome proved detrimental to both Roosevelt Johnson and Kromah, as ULIMO-J's alienation and the new political framework stratagem converged against both leaders' limited political backgrounds and mass appeal.<sup>394</sup> As a result, it essentially preserved the potential for future conflict.

Under the terms of Abuja I, a ceasefire commenced on August 26, 1995.<sup>395</sup> Once again, the brokered peace remained tenuous. In December 1995, ULIMO-J forces violated the ceasefire agreement, attacking ECOMOG forces in Gbarma and Tubmanburg<sup>396</sup> and repeatedly using civilians as human shields.<sup>397</sup> During the fighting, ULIMO-J forces killed 16 Nigerian ECOMOG peacekeepers, wounded 78 others, and seized the peacekeepers' arms.<sup>398</sup>

At this time, Taylor was setting the stage for a third battle in Monrovia by contriving a rift between ULIMO-J and ECOMOG.<sup>399</sup> Using a murder reportedly committed by Roosevelt Johnson's forces, Taylor urged the government to respond.<sup>400</sup> The Council of State attempted to arrest Roosevelt Johnson, compelling him to seek refuge in AFL military barracks.<sup>401</sup> Roosevelt Johnson insisted that the police represented henchmen of Charles Taylor's NPFL and would not afford him just treatment.<sup>402</sup> The confrontation launched the third battle for Monrovia on April 6, 1996.<sup>403</sup> ULIMO-J, LPC, and AFL forces fought against NPFL and ULIMO-K.<sup>404</sup> Within the first few days, an estimated 2,000 people were killed,<sup>405</sup> with total fatalities rising to 3,000 people.<sup>406</sup> One statement giver recalled that the death toll was so high that human bones began to pile up in the streets.<sup>407</sup> Another statement giver witnessed combatants throwing bodies into the river.<sup>408</sup>

Statements attribute responsibility to all sides for human rights violations during the third battle for Monrovia. Liberians described seeing both rebel and military forces burning homes, attacking

families,<sup>409</sup> killing,<sup>410</sup> and seeking revenge.<sup>411</sup> Tactics used previously throughout the war, such as forced cannibalism and tabay, were again employed to terrorize the population. One statement giver described how NPFL rebels sought to inflict this punishment on him and his family on April 6:

They cut my grandfather's throat and cut his heart. We were all forced to drink his blood. They cut off my grandfather's head and were going to make us eat it. I cried, "No, no."<sup>412</sup>

Another statement giver, who was aligned with Doe loyalists, described how NPFL rebels arrested him, told him that he would not live to tell the story, and tabayed him.<sup>413</sup> Numerous statement givers witnessed or were subjected to tabay.<sup>414</sup> One statement giver described this treatment as being so painful and harmful that a tabay victim "would only have about an hour to live."<sup>415</sup>

"Violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons,\* in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment" and threats thereof are prohibited at all times and places. *Art. 4(2)(a), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (1977).*

\*"Persons" indicates those who are not taking a direct part in or those who are no longer taking part in hostilities. *Id.* at Art. 4(1)

As discussed above, the third battle for Monrovia featured atrocities and targeting similar to those in the preceding hostilities.<sup>416</sup> This time, however, statement accounts revealed the role of the new factions in perpetrating these and other abuses. One statement giver described the role of the LPC in assaulting, abducting, and sexually abusing him because he refused to give them water. He summarized his experience:

In April 1996, during the third battle for Monrovia, I was near the Governor's mansion selling cold water...Fighting broke out. Several men in a truck passed and demanded that I give them water. When I refused, they slapped me, hit me, and beat me. When I still refused, they grabbed me and put me in a pickup truck. I still have a scar on my nose from where I was hit with a rifle butt by the men in the truck. The men, who were with the LPC, took me to a dark house where I was required to entertain them. They would beat me and use me as their "playboy." I spent several months in the house with the LPC and they threatened to make me fight for them.<sup>417</sup>

In the chaos, the fighters used extortions to obtain goods for themselves. One statement giver described how ULIMO-J rebels demanded money from her father. When he could not provide it,

they punished her father. She recounted:

In that night, they captured my father and killed him. My father was a businessman. The ULIMO-J rebels came late in the night and called out, “Come out. Where’s the money?” My father responded, “I don’t have money. Just [enough] to sustain myself.” They beat him with rocks and guns. They tore him apart. Then they came for me and said I should take care of my father.<sup>418</sup>

The chaos and violence drove Liberians to seek refuge.<sup>419</sup> One statement giver described the massive flight that ensued:

Militants burned my house in Monrovia, and at gunpoint, my family left. The whole neighborhood fled. Once they see one family run, the next family followed.<sup>420</sup>

Several Krahn hid in the abandoned military barracks in Monrovia.<sup>421</sup> When the rebels were unable to take the barracks,<sup>422</sup> Taylor ordered his forces to fire rockets at the barracks, which killed many people.<sup>423</sup>

Many statement givers reported seeking haven at the U.S. Embassy’s Greystone Compound.<sup>424</sup> Some Liberians were able to stay in a dormitory in the compound, but others were relegated to an outside area with limited shelter and no sanitation facilities.<sup>425</sup> Both areas presented difficulties because of health problems and hazardous conditions. One statement giver who lived in the outside area stated her baby became ill due to heavy rains, while she contracted a high fever and lost significant weight because of sickness.<sup>426</sup> People developed diarrhea because the toilet was located near their water source, which was heavily contaminated.<sup>427</sup> Another statement giver described how they had to pour the drinking water out slowly to avoid consuming maggots.<sup>428</sup> Food was also scarce at the compound, forcing people to venture out of the compound to buy food at the rebel lines.<sup>429</sup> While the compound provided relative safety from the rebels, it was not completely secure from gunfire.<sup>430</sup> One statement giver reported that NPFL rebels would shoot haphazardly over the fence to try to kill people.<sup>431</sup>

“[M]easures shall be taken, if necessary, and whenever possible with the consent of their parents or persons who by law or custom are primarily responsible for their care, to remove children temporarily from the area in which hostilities are taking place to a safer area within the country and ensure that they are accompanied by persons responsible for their safety and well-being.” *Art. 4(3)(e), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (1977).*

Statements revealed that ECO-MOG played a significant role in helping people escape the war in Liberia as well as in dispersing fighting forces and therefore stopping further human rights abuses. For example, many statement givers described how ECOMOG evacuated them by ship or truck to other countries. Most statement givers did not indicate they provided any payment for such transfer, although at least one statement giver reported she had paid \$50 “to be stowed away on an ECOMOG boat to Ghana.”<sup>432</sup> ECOMOG facilitated Liberians’ passage to cities and neighboring countries, such as Ghana, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and Guinea. One statement giver summarized:

There was no way out. There were no more flights. No way to go out by car. ECOWAS soldiers provided the only safety we had.<sup>433</sup>

Yet another ceasefire agreement commenced on April 19, 1996.<sup>434</sup> When Taylor and Kromah returned to their government positions, however, Roosevelt Johnson’s forces resumed fighting a mere ten days later.<sup>435</sup> By mid-May 1996, the United Nations reported that the fighting appeared to be at a stalemate.<sup>436</sup> While the factions controlled different parts of Monrovia, no single group appeared able to assume full control.<sup>437</sup>

## **ABUJA II: AUGUST 1996**

On August 17, 1996, another ECOWAS-brokered peace agreement was signed in Abuja, Nigeria with a revised timetable that called for elections to be held in 1997.<sup>438</sup> The agreement extended the timetable for disarmament and elections beyond the original timetable of Abuja I and added the threat of sanctions, including a bar against running for elected office and prosecution for war crimes, against anyone violating the agreement.<sup>439</sup> Under the terms of Abuja II, ECOMOG began disarming the fighting factions in November 1996 with assistance from the United Nations.<sup>440</sup> A new ceasefire was declared on August 20, 1996, and elections were set for May 30, 1997,<sup>441</sup> although ECOMOG later postponed the elections until July 19, 1997, to allow time for preparation.<sup>442</sup> On September 3, 1996, Ruth Perry, a former Liberian senator, assumed her position as Chairman of the reformed Council of State.<sup>443</sup>

All citizens have the right to “vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.” *Art. 25(b), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966).*

Although the promise of elections brought some hope for change, the NPFL still engaged in intimidation of voters leading up to the elections.<sup>444</sup> A statement giver summarized how rebels punished her entire family for a speech her mother gave in 1996, when her mother asserted that anyone involved in the war should not be voted for as President:

Because of that speech, our neighbors brought his [rebel] friends to our house. When they got there, they asked all of us to come outside to them. When we came out of the house, they asked for our mother O. and we said they were gone on the farm. Then my sister, S.B., along with my grandmother, K., and my uncle, they all died on the spot. My sister S. and I were raped, beaten by them and they tied us on the tree. They went away, but before going, they told us that they will be back, and then they left us.<sup>445</sup>

The first Liberian civil war was both violent and tragic. Some commentators regard it as one of Africa's bloodiest civil wars.<sup>446</sup> In addition to killing hundreds of thousands of people and displacing more than one million, the war rendered countless civilians victims of other egregious human rights abuses. Numerous actors, ranging from combatants who committed violations, leaders who condoned, facilitated or ordered the atrocities, and onlookers who failed to intervene, bear responsibility for this suffering. One statement giver's opinion about Charles Taylor is illustrative of the destruction and pain these actors perpetrated on Liberia. To this statement giver:

[Taylor] was a man of greed to whom nothing mattered other than his flamboyant lifestyle. His destruction of Liberia's youth...has put a curse on Liberia, and I wish I could scratch out that part of the country's history.<sup>447</sup>



## Notes

- 1 STEPHEN ELLIS, THE MASK OF ANARCHY: THE DESTRUCTION OF LIBERIA AND THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION OF AN AFRICAN CIVIL WAR 78-79 (1999).
- 2 THE LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, LIBERIA: A PROMISE BETRAYED 24-25 (1986).
- 3 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1740.
- 4 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1663.
- 5 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 117.
- 6 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1462.
- 7 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1990: LIBERIA 192 (1991) [hereinafter DEP'T OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS 1990].
- 8 Della Matthews & Susan MacDonald, *March by Rebel Forces Cuts Liberia in Two*, TIMES (London), May 1, 1990.
- 9 *Id.*
- 10 JEREMY I. LEVITT, THE EVOLUTION OF DEADLY CONFLICT IN LIBERIA: FROM 'PATERNALTARIANISM' TO STATE COLLAPSE 206 (2005).
- 11 ELLIS, *supra* note 1, at 92.
- 12 *Id.* at 312-13.
- 13 DEP'T OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS 1990, *supra* note 7, at 193.
- 14 *Id.*
- 15 *See, e.g.*, TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 120 and 151.
- 16 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1718.
- 17 *See, e.g.*, TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 36.
- 18 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1523.
- 19 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 181.
- 20 Food shortages were at their worst levels in the first year of the war, with some improvement over subsequent years. Robert M. Press, *In Rebel-Controlled Areas, Human Rights Abuses Persist*, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 4, 1992, at 11. This was due largely to the fact that there were fewer mouths to feed in later years. However, disease became increasingly worse with each year. *Id.*
- 21 *Half of Liberia Displaced, U.S. Report Says*, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1991, at A5.
- 22 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1338.
- 23 *Id.*
- 24 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 22.
- 25 *E.g.*, TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1350.
- 26 *E.g.*, TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1564 (stating that NPFL monopolized the food supply in her village and civilians would be killed if they were found with rice).
- 27 *E.g.*, TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 188 and 1338.
- 28 DEP'T OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS 1990, *supra* note 7, at 193.
- 29 *See, e.g.*, TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 22.
- 30 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 26.
- 31 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1462.
- 32 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 888.
- 33 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 919.
- 34 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1415.
- 35 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1015.
- 36 TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 1347 and 63.
- 37 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1347. It is unclear in this statement whether the 10,000 amount was in U.S. or Liberian currency.
- 38 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 63.
- 39 *Id.*
- 40 It was also difficult to move goods within the countryside. For example, a person carrying letters through a checkpoint would be required to surrender them to soldiers. Human Rights Watch, *The Cycle of Abuse: Human Rights Violations since the November Cease-Fire*, Oct. 21, 1991 [hereinafter *The Cycle of Abuse*], <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1991/liberia/>.
- 41 *Id.*
- 42 Edward Cody, *Revenge Drives Liberian Rebels; Young Insurgents Rule by Gun in Chaotic Countryside*, WASH. POST, July 14, 1990, at A1.
- 43 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1352.
- 44 *Id.*
- 45 See Chapter 13 for more information on checkpoints during the civil wars.
- 46 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1417.
- 47 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 45.
- 48 *Id.*
- 49 *See, e.g.*, TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 36, 574, 1564.
- 50 DEP'T OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS 1990, *supra* note 7, at 192.

- 51 *Id.*; see also Human Rights Watch, *Flight from Terror: Testimony of Abuses in Nimba County*, May 1, 1990 [hereinafter *Flight from Terror*], <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/1990/05/01/liberia-flight-terror>.
- 52 DEP'T OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS 1990, *supra* note 7, at 192.
- 53 See Chapter 4 for more information about tribalism during the Liberian conflict.
- 54 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 164.
- 55 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 116 (stating that Charles Taylor's rebels were looking for people who had worked for the Tolbert government). See also TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 763, 165, 252, 292, 310, 377, 389, 394, 451, 452, 454, 468, 472, 478, 482, 563, 587, 672.
- 56 TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 717, 732, 527, 551, 292, 451, 465, 468, 593.
- 57 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1551.
- 58 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1352.
- 59 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1437.
- 60 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1652.
- 61 *Id.*
- 62 TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 292, 300, 303, 404, 655, 305 (discussing the targeting of Kru people), 706 (discussing the targeting of Sarpo people, in one case because rebels misidentified Sarpo as Krahn based on their shared dialect), 553 (discussing targeting of Lorma people), 576 (discussing LURD's killing of the Bassa people).
- 63 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 553.
- 64 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 106 and 1569 (describing herself as being of the Sarpo-Krahn tribe).
- 65 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1459.
- 66 TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 1440, 1512 and 1551.
- 67 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1354.
- 68 *Id.*
- 69 See TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 1287 and 1549.
- 70 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 833.
- 71 *Id.*
- 72 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1021.
- 73 *Id.*
- 74 See Chapter 13 for more information on use of checkpoints during the Liberian civil wars.
- 75 TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 122 (describing how AFL soldiers pulled statement giver's brother, a Gio, out of the line at Krahn checkpoint, tied him up, beat him, and cut off his ear) and 1551 (describing how rebels killed civilians at checkpoints based on the assumption that because they had marks on their legs resembling impressions from boots they were soldiers); see also 1512 (describing how rebels allowed statement giver and his friends to pass through because they did not have boot marks).
- 76 TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 1255, 457, 641.
- 77 TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 1658 and 438.
- 78 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 164.
- 79 See Chapter 6 for more information about tactics during the civil wars.
- 80 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 237.
- 81 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1467.
- 82 *Id.*
- 83 *Id.*
- 84 See, e.g., TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 240 (describing how NPFL rebels shot her uncle, who worked for Doe, in Robertsport in 1990).
- 85 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 166.
- 86 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 61.
- 87 See, e.g., TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 42, 152, 155, 406, 540, 541, 549, 550, 709, 808, 812, 835, 836, 861, 881, 862, 913, 914, 1048, 1218, 1350, 1352, 1354, 1477, 1512, 1551, 1552, 1556.
- 88 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 42; see also Statement 1350 (describing how it was common for fighters to tabaya a victim, then cut out the victim's heart).
- 89 See, e.g., TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 1502 (forcing a Mandingo man to sing and dance like a puppet before they killed him) and 1287 (forcing a victim to sing).
- 90 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1274.
- 91 Human Rights Watch, *Liberia: A Human Rights Disaster: Violations of the Laws of War by All Parties to the Conflict* 8-9, Oct. 26, 1990 [hereinafter *Liberia: A Human Rights Disaster*], <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/liberia1990.pdf>.
- 92 *Flight from Terror*, *supra* note 51.
- 93 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 823.
- 94 *Id.*
- 95 *Id.*

- 96 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1354.
- 97 *Id.*
- 98 *Id.*
- 99 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 107.
- 100 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1520.
- 101 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 205.
- 102 *Id.*
- 103 *Id.*
- 104 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 115.
- 105 *Id.*
- 106 DEP'T OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS 1990, *supra* note 7, at 194.
- 107 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 230.
- 108 DEP'T OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS 1990, *supra* note 7, at 193.
- 109 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 123.
- 110 ELLIS, *supra* note 1, at 84. Ellis notes that as early as February 1990, there were indications of division between the NPFL and INPFL. *Id.* at 82. Human Rights Watch estimates that the INPFL split from the NPFL as early as February 1990. *Liberia: A Human Rights Disaster*, *supra* note 91, at 3.
- 111 *Liberia: A Human Rights Disaster*, *supra* note 91, at 3.
- 112 *Id.*
- 113 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1440.
- 114 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 247.
- 115 *Id.*
- 116 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 325.
- 117 *See, e.g.*, TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 1587 (describing how statement giver's resistance to rape by INPFL rebels resulted in them stabbing her in the chest and killing her son) and 547 (describing how rebels shot and killed statement giver's sister after she refused to become a bush wife for them).
- 118 TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 389 (describing how Prince Johnson shot and killed his entire family in front of statement giver), 44 (describing how Prince Johnson killed other people, including a woman accused of spying for Taylor and a founder of a local school), 790 (describing how Prince Johnson shot statement giver's uncle and three friends for not giving his men canoes).
- 119 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 88.
- 120 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 247.
- 121 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1180.
- 122 *See, e.g.* TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 919.
- 123 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 403.
- 124 *Id.*
- 125 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1586.
- 126 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1579.
- 127 *See* DEP'T OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS 1990, *supra* note 7, at 192.
- 128 *Liberia: A Human Rights Disaster*, *supra* note 91, at 3.
- 129 ELLIS, *supra* note 1, at 124. Ellis notes that people came to Monrovia from throughout the country and adjacent countries during these clashes for what they saw as the chance to plunder valuables for themselves. *Id.*
- 130 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1651.
- 131 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1564.
- 132 *Id.*
- 133 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 913. *But see* TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1415 (describing how a radio station reported that rebels were nearby, causing people to stockpile food and basic supplies).
- 134 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 15.
- 135 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1415.
- 136 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 210.
- 137 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1576.
- 138 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 742. The statement giver was unable to identify to which rebel group they belonged, but noted the perpetrators wore red with scorpions on their shirts. *Id.*
- 139 *Id.*
- 140 *Id.*
- 141 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 106.
- 142 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 34.
- 143 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 913.
- 144 Other inappropriate treatment of the bodies included cannibalism.
- 145 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1354.
- 146 *See* TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 230, 469, 1203. The New York Times reported witness estimates at 600 and U.S. State Department reported estimates at 200-300. *Liberia Troops Accused Of Massacre in Church*, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1990. A later report from the State Department estimated the number of deaths to be 600. DEP'T OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS 1990,

- supra* note 7, at 192.
- 147 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 114.
- 148 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 26.
- 149 Dr. Patricia Jabbeh Wesley, Testimony at the Diaspora Public Hearings of the Truth & Reconciliation Comm'n of Liberia 20 (June 13, 2008, St. Paul, Minn., U.S.A.) (transcript on file with author).
- 150 *Id.*
- 151 *Id.*
- 152 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 26.
- 153 *Id.*
- 154 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1551.
- 155 TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 469 and 1203.
- 156 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1203.
- 157 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1484.
- 158 Dr. Patricia Jabbeh Wesley, Testimony at the Diaspora Public Hearings of the Truth & Reconciliation Comm'n of Liberia 20 (June 13, 2008, St. Paul, Minn., U.S.A.) (transcript on file with author).
- 159 *Id.*
- 160 *Id.*
- 161 Interview with Patrick Kugmeh, former Presidential Press Secretary to Samuel K. Doe, in Minneapolis, Minn., at 36-37 (August 11, 2008) (transcript on file with author).
- 162 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1554.
- 163 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 913.
- 164 *Id.*
- 165 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 34.
- 166 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 343.
- 167 See Chapter 13 for more information about family separation.
- 168 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 913.
- 169 *Id.*
- 170 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 820.
- 171 *Id.*
- 172 See Chapter 13 for more information about abuses during flight.
- 173 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1554.
- 174 *Id.*
- 175 See Mitikishe Maxwell Khobe, Inst. for Security Studies, *The Evolution and Conduct of ECOMOG Operations in West Africa*, Feb. 2000, <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No44/ECOMOG.html>; *see also* DEP'T OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS 1990, *supra* note 7, at 192.
- 176 W. Ofuately-Kodjoe, *Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia*, 1 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 261, 262 (1994). The Protocol on Mutual Defense Assistance, signed in Freetown, Sierra Leone in May 1981, provided for mutual military aid to a member in the case of external aggression, as well as in the case of internal armed conflict that was supported by external forces if it was likely to be a threat to the peace and security of other member states. Chapter V, Articles 13 and 14. The Protocol was not implemented, however, and the Allied Armed Forces of the Community envisioned remained un-established.
- 177 Comfort Ero, *ECOWAS and the Subregional Peacekeeping in Liberia*, J. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (September 1995), [www.jha.ac/articles/a005.htm](http://www.jha.ac/articles/a005.htm); Khobe, *supra* note 175. The five members of the SMC (The Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Togo, with Guinea and Sierra Leone as observers) met in Banjul, Gambia in July 1990 with representatives of Doe and Taylor and proposed an ECOWAS Peace Plan, which called for (among other things) an immediate ceasefire and the establishment of a peacekeeping force. *See* Ofuately-Kodjoe, *supra* note 176, at 261-302; Khobe, *supra* note 175; Ero, *supra* note 177.
- 178 *See* S. Byron Tarr, *The Ecomog Initiative in Liberia: A Liberian Perspective*, 21 ISSUE: A JOURNAL OF OPINION 76, 74-83 (1993); ELLIS, *supra* note 1, at 86; Ero, *supra* note 177.
- 179 Khobe, *supra* note 175; Ademola Adeleke, *The Politics and Diplomacy of Peacekeeping in West Africa: The Ecomog Operation in Liberia*, 33 J. OF MOD. AFR. STUDIES 569-93 (Dec. 1995).
- 180 Ofuately-Kodjoe, *supra* note 176, at 272.
- 181 Adeleke, *supra* note 179, at 569-93.
- 182 Max A. Sesay, *Civil War and Collective Intervention in Liberia*, 23 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 35-52 (1996).
- 183 *Id.*
- 184 *Id.*
- 185 Ofuately-Kodjoe, *supra* note 176, at 272.
- 186 *Id.*; Adeleke, *supra* note 179, at 576.
- 187 *See, e.g.*, Ofuately-Kodjoe, *supra* note 176, at 272.; Adeleke, *supra* note 179, at 577-78; Christopher Tuck,

- Every Car Or Moving Object Gone: The ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia*, 4 AFR. STUDIES QUARTERLY (2000), <http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v4/v4i1a1.htm>.
- 188 *Nigeria: A history of coups*, BBC NEWS, Feb. 15, 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/analysis/83449.stm>; Tuck, *supra* note 187.
- 189 *See, e.g.*, Tuck, *supra* note 187.
- 190 ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Decision A/DEC.1/8/90 on the Ceasefire and Establishment of an ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group for Liberia, Banjul, Republic of Gambia, Art. 2(3), (Aug. 7, 1990), *reprinted in* REGIONAL PEACE-KEEPING AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT: THE LIBERIAN CRISIS 67, at 68 (Marc Weller ed., 1994). *See* Terhi Lehtinen, *Liberia in AGENTS, MOTIVES & INSTRUMENTS: AN ATLAS OF AFRICA CONFLICTS* 153 (Timo Kirimaki & Lisa Laakso eds., 2002).
- 191 *See id.*
- 192 *See* Human Rights Watch, *Waging War to Keep the Peace: The ECOMOG Intervention and Human Rights*, June 1, 1993 [hereinafter *Waging War to Keep the Peace*], <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1993/liberia/>.
- 193 Ero, *supra* note 177.
- 194 J. Mackinlay & A. Alao, *Liberia 1994: ECOMOG and UNOMIL, Response to a Complex Emergency*, <http://www.unu.edu/unupress/ops2.html> (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
- 195 ECOWAS helped broker seven major peace agreements prior to the Cotonou Accord of 1993. The agreements included the Bamako Ceasefire of November 1990, the Banjul Joint Statement of December 1990, the February 1991 Lome Agreement, and the Yamoussoukro I, II, III and IV Accords of June-October 1991. Charles Abiodun Alao, *Commentary on the Accords, Conciliation Resources*, <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/liberia/commentary.php> (last visited Sept. 17, 2008).
- 196 Tuck, *supra* note 187.
- 197 Michelle Pitts, *Sub-Regional Solutions for African Conflict: The ECOMOG Experiment*, 19 J. CONFLICT STUDIES 49-68 (1999).
- 198 Human Rights Watch, *World Report 1998 – Liberia Human Rights Developments* 47, Jan. 1, 1998, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,HRW,,LBR,3ae6a8c04,0.html>.
- 199 *See* DEP'T OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS 1990, *supra* note 7, at 192.
- 200 LEVITT, *supra* note 10, at 208; Adeleke, *supra* note 179, at 579.
- 201 Khobe, *supra* note 175.
- 202 *Id.* Mackinlay & Alao, *supra* note 194; Adeleke, *supra* note 179, at 578-79.
- 203 Mackinlay & Alao, *supra* note 194.
- 204 *Id.* The 1993 Cotonou Agreement appeared to address these concerns by requiring that ECOMOG include non-West African troops and joint implementation with UNOMIL. Cotonou Accord, Interim Government of National Unity of Liberia (IGNU)-National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)-United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), art. 3, July 25, 1993, <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/liberia/cotonou-accord%20.php>.
- 205 Other statements, however, highlighted human rights abuses perpetrated by ECOMOG soldiers. *See supra* text associated with nn. 175 - 238.
- 206 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1017.
- 207 TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 566 and 965.
- 208 TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 812 and 767.
- 209 TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 811 and 974.
- 210 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 685 and 670.
- 211 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 578.
- 212 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 617.
- 213 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 561.
- 214 Ero, *supra* note 177; *Waging War to Keep the Peace, supra* note 91. *See supra* text associated with nn. 175 - 238.
- 215 REGIONAL PEACE-KEEPING AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT: THE LIBERIAN CRISIS 86 (M. Weller, ed., 1994) (citing BBC Monitoring Report, *Liberia Banjul Talks Begin: ECOMOG Again Delayed; Taylor Warns He Will Fight*, Aug. 21, 1990, Aug. 23, 1990).
- 216 Michael A. Innes, *Denial-of-Resource Operations and NPFL Radio Dominance in the Liberian Civil War*, 7 CIVIL WARS 288, 297 (2005).
- 217 *Liberia's Cowboys*, ECONOMIST, Oct. 13, 1990, at 47.
- 218 *See* Ero, *supra* note 177.
- 219 *Id.*
- 220 Mackinlay & Alao, *supra* note 194.
- 221 *See Waging War to Keep the Peace, supra* note 91; Ero, *supra* note 177.

- 222 See *Waging War to Keep the Peace*, *supra* note 91.
- 223 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1440 (“In retaliation for the ECOMOG soldiers’ aggression, Taylor lined up and shot some of the nationals he had been holding in captivity.”)
- 224 *The Cycle of Abuse*, *supra* note 40.
- 225 *Liberian Rebel Boss Threatens Civilians*, COURIER MAIL, Aug. 23, 1990.
- 226 *Liberian Rebels “Kill 200 Foreigners,”* TIMES (London), Sept. 1, 1990.
- 227 For example, Taylor succeeded in taking 3,000 Nigerian nationals hostage at the Nigerian embassy. Herbert Howe, *Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping*, in NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICT 267, 272 n.10 (Michael E. Brown, et al. eds., rev. ed. 2001).
- 228 *Liberian Rebel Boss Threatens Civilians*, *supra* note 225.
- 229 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 236.
- 230 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 115.
- 231 *Id.*
- 232 *Id.*
- 233 *Id.*
- 234 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 28.
- 235 *Liberian Rebel Boss Threatens Civilians*, *supra* note 225; Klon Hinneh, *Taylor Says He’ll Free 800 Foreign Nationals*, ASSOC. PRESS, Aug. 29, 1991.
- 236 *The Cycle of Abuse*, *supra* note 40.
- 237 *ECOMOG Bombs Airport; Nigerian Concern for Nurses and Journalists*, BBC RADIO, Oct. 2, 1990.
- 238 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1086.
- 239 DEP’T OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS 1990, *supra* note 7, at 193.
- 240 Human Rights Watch, *Liberia: Human Rights Developments*, 1990, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1990/WR90/AFRICA.BOU-04.htm>; *The Cycle of Abuse*, *supra* note 40.
- 241 Peter Dennis, Int’l Center for Transitional Justice, *A Brief History of Liberia* 10, May 2006, <http://www.ictj.org/static/Africa/Liberia/BriefHistory.pdf>.
- 242 *Id.*
- 243 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 34.
- 244 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 119.
- 245 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 903.
- 246 Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights Abuses by the Liberian Peace Council and the Need for International Oversight* 4, May 17 [hereinafter *Abuses by Liberian Peace Council*], 1994, <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/1994/05/17/human-rights-abuses-liberian-peace-council-and-need-international-oversight>.
- 247 *The Cycle of Abuse*, *supra* note 40.
- 248 DEP’T OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS 1990, *supra* note 7, at 192.
- 249 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1476.
- 250 *The Cycle of Abuse*, *supra* note 40.
- 251 See generally *id.*
- 252 *Waging War to Keep the Peace*, *supra* note 91.
- 253 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 707.
- 254 *Id.*
- 255 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1375.
- 256 *Waging War to Keep the Peace*, *supra* note 91.
- 257 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1739.
- 258 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 42.
- 259 *Waging War to Keep the Peace*, *supra* note 91. U.N. Agency Says 3,000 Feared Dead in Monrovia, REUTERS, Nov. 3, 1992.
- 260 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1739.
- 261 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1598.
- 262 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1375.
- 263 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 74.
- 264 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 42.
- 265 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1375.
- 266 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1731.
- 267 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1739.
- 268 *Id.*
- 269 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1375.
- 270 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 707.
- 271 *Waging War to Keep the Peace*, *supra* note 91.
- 272 *Id.*
- 273 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1632. See also Jane Samukai, Testimony at the Diaspora Public Hearings of the Truth & Reconciliation Comm’n of Liberia 4 (June 13, 2008, St. Paul, Minn., U.S.A.) (transcript on file with author) (describing how NPFL rebels took their home, vehicles, personal belongings, and food when they invaded Monrovia).
- 274 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 22.
- 275 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1580.



- 276 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1566.
- 277 *See Waging War to Keep the Peace, supra* note 91.
- 278 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 42.
- 279 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1739.
- 280 *Id.*
- 281 *Id.*
- 282 Hassan Kiawu, Testimony at the Diaspora Public Hearings of the Truth & Reconciliation Comm'n of Liberia 31-32 (June 14, 2008, St. Paul, Minn., U.S.A.) (transcript on file with author).
- 283 *Id.*
- 284 ELLIS, *supra* note 1, at 99; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1993: LIBERIA 148 (1994).
- 285 ELLIS, *supra* note 1, at 99; STATE DEP'T COUNTRY REPORTS 1993, *supra* note 284, at 148.
- 286 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 36.
- 287 Conciliation Resources, "Liberia: Chronology," <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/liberia/chronology.php>, accessed 7/21/08. Prince Johnson, the leader of the INPFL, became an elected senator in the Liberian legislature after the end of the conflict.
- 288 *Human Rights Abuses by the Liberian Peace Council, supra* note 246.
- 289 *Id.*
- 290 *Id.*
- 291 On November 19, 1992, the U.N. Security Council imposed weapons sanctions on all factions. S.C. Res. 788, U.N. Doc. S/Res/788 (Nov. 19, 1992) On September 22, 1993, the United Nations established the U.N. Observer Mission in Liberia. S.C. Res. 866, U.N. Doc. S/Res/866 (Sept. 22, 1993).
- 292 *See* Cindy Shiner, *Large Weapon Stockpiles Could Prolong Liberia War*, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 1, 1992, at 5.
- 293 The Secretary General, *Eighth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia* at 5, U.N. Doc. S/1995/9 (Jan. 6, 1995) [hereinafter The Secretary General, *Eighth Progress Report*].
- 294 INS RESOURCE INFO. CENTER, ALERT SERIES AL/LBR/94.001, LIBERIA: DISINTEGRATION OF THE LIBERIAN NATION SINCE THE 1989 CIVIL WAR 35 (1993), <http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/libera94.pdf>.
- 295 ELLIS, *supra* note 1, at 95; *Waging War to Keep the Peace, supra* note 91.
- 296 ELLIS, *supra* note 1, at 95; *Waging War to Keep the Peace, supra* note 91. Accounts of ULIMO violations in its early years are less prevalent among statements, and most statements containing ULIMO references describe violations that began in 1993.
- 297 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1652.
- 298 Thomas Jaye, *Liberia: An Analysis of Post-Taylor Politics*, 30 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 643, 646 (2003); ADEKEYE ADEBAJO, LIBERIA'S CIVIL WAR: NIGERIA, ECOMOG AND REGIONAL SECURITY IN WEST AFRICA 112 (2002) [hereinafter ADEBAJO, LIBERIA'S CIVIL WAR].
- 299 Int'l Crisis Group, *Liberia: The Key to Ending Regional Instability* 2, Apr. 24, 2002, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=1533>.
- 300 *Id.*
- 301 Dennis, *supra* note 241, at 3.
- 302 ELLIS, *supra* note 1, at 135.
- 303 *Id.* at 95.
- 304 *Id.* at 104.
- 305 *Id.* at 126.
- 306 *Id.* at 101.
- 307 *Id.*
- 308 *Id.* at 101-102.
- 309 *Abuses by the Liberian Peace Council, supra* note 246.
- 310 *Id.* Ellis and Human Rights Watch note that the LPC allegedly received support from ECOMOG. ELLIS, *supra* note 1, at 102; *Abuses by the Liberian Peace Council, supra* note 246. The LPC was launched in 1991 and re-formed in May 1993. ELLIS, *supra* note 1, at 100.
- 311 *Abuses by the Liberian Peace Council, supra* note 246.
- 312 ELLIS, *supra* note 1, at 102.
- 313 *Abuses by the Liberian Peace Council, supra* note 246.
- 314 *Waging War to Keep the Peace, supra* note 91.
- 315 *Id.*
- 316 ELLIS, *supra* note 1, at 102.
- 317 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1412.
- 318 Joshua Hammer, *Witness to Insanity*, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 29, 1996.
- 319 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1467. Later, the statement giver was able to obtain some degree of relief when she lodged a complaint at the local



- ECOMOG base, where she was taken to a doctor, received medication, and was allowed to identify the offending soldier.
- 320 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 230.
- 321 *Id.*
- 322 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1304.
- 323 *Waging War to Keep the Peace*, *supra* note 91; *see also* TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 411, 847, 172.
- 324 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 206.
- 325 *Id.*
- 326 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 411.
- 327 See Chapter 13 for more information.
- 328 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 206.
- 329 *Id.*
- 330 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 847.
- 331 *See* TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 893.
- 332 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1553.
- 333 *See* TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1433.
- 334 See Chapter 13 for more information.
- 335 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 893.
- 336 *Id.*
- 337 *Id.*
- 338 *Id.*
- 339 TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 172, 206, 1493, 1700.
- 340 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 206.
- 341 *Id.*
- 342 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1639.
- 343 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 665.
- 344 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1021.
- 345 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 42.
- 346 TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 344 and 514.
- 347 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 514.
- 348 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 120.
- 349 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 888.
- 350 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 176.
- 351 TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 514 and 888.
- 352 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1099.
- 353 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 514.
- 354 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 261.
- 355 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 888.
- 356 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1516.
- 357 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 514.
- 358 Cindy Shiner, *In Battle and in Politics, Liberia's Motley Factions Fight On*, WASH. POST (FOREIGN SERV.), Aug. 7, 1994, at A27.
- 359 Akosombo Agreement, National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)-United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO)-Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), Part II, Section A(i), Sept. 12, 1994, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b4f01c.html>.
- 360 *Id.*; ELLIS, *supra* note 1, at 103.
- 361 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 166.
- 362 ELLIS, *supra* note 1, at 103.
- 363 *Id.* at 104; *see also* Max Ahmadu Sesay, *Bringing peace to Liberia*, 1 ACCORD 9 (1996), <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/liberia/bringing-peace.php>.
- 364 For example, ULIMO-J forces violated the Abuja I ceasefire agreement and attacked ECOMOG forces in December 1995. The Secretary-General, *Fifteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*, ¶ 2, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1996/47 (Jan. 23, 1996).
- 365 Kerper Dwanyen, Testimony at the Diaspora Public Hearings of the Truth & Reconciliation Comm'n of Liberia 22-27 (June 14, 2008, St. Paul, Minn., U.S.A.) (transcript on file with author). The Nimba Redemption Council was formed to drive Taylor's forces from Nimba County. INS RESOURCE INFO. CENTER, ALERT SERIES LIBERIA: DISINTEGRATION OF THE LIBERIAN NATION SINCE THE 1989 CIVIL WAR 25 (1993).
- 366 Kerper Dwanyen, Testimony at the Diaspora Public Hearings of the Truth & Reconciliation Comm'n of Liberia 25-27 (June 14, 2008, St. Paul, Minn., U.S.A.) (transcript on file with author).
- 367 *Id.*
- 368 *Id.*
- 369 Sesay, *supra* note 363. Woewiyu has suggested that it was his support for and Taylor's rejection of the interim government that led to their split. Telephone interview by Dorsey & Whitney, LLP with Thomas Woewiyu (July 17, 2008) (on file with author).
- 370 The Secretary General, *Eighth Progress Report*, *supra* note 293, at 3.
- 371 *LIBERIA: A Chronology of 25 years of conflict and turmoil*, IRIN NEWS, <http://www.irinnews.org/>

- Report.aspx?ReportId=57838 (last visited Apr. 21, 2009). On December 21, 1994, ULIMO (Roosevelt Johnson), the LDF (Massaquoi), the LPC (Boley), NPFL-CRC (Woewiyu), and the LNC (Junius), as non-signatories, signed the Acceptance and Accession Agreement, thus signifying their accession to the Akosombo agreement and the agreement on clarification of the aforesaid Akosombo agreement. Acceptance and Accession Agreement ¶ 1, Dec. 21, 1994, [http://www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/liberia\\_12211994\\_accept.html](http://www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/liberia_12211994_accept.html).
- 372 Accra Acceptance and Accession Agreement and Accra Clarification, Preamble, Parts I-II, Dec. 21, 1994, <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/liberia/accra-clarification.php>; *see also* The Secretary General, *Eighth Progress Report*, *supra* note 293, at 4.
- 373 *See* The Secretary General, *Eighth Progress Report*, *supra* note 293, at 4.
- 374 *See id.*; *see also* the Secretary General, *Twelfth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia*, at 4, U.N. Doc. S/1995/781 (Sept. 13, 1995) [hereinafter The Secretary General, *Twelfth Progress Report*]; The Secretary General, *Ninth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia*, at 4, U.N. Doc. S/1995/158 (Feb. 24, 1995) [hereinafter The Secretary General, *Ninth Progress Report*].
- 375 *See* The Secretary General, *Eleventh Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia*, at 4, U.N. Doc. S/1995/473 (June 10, 1995).
- 376 *See id.*
- 377 *See id.*
- 378 *See* The Secretary General, *Eighth Progress Report*, *supra* note 293, at 3.; *see also* The Secretary General, *Ninth Progress Report*, *supra* note 374, at 3.
- 379 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 616.
- 380 *Id.*
- 381 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 134.
- 382 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1500.
- 383 *Id.*
- 384 *See, e.g.*, TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 86 and 1116.
- 385 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1385.
- 386 *Id.*
- 387 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 517.
- 388 ELLIS, *supra* note 1, at 105; *see also* Global Connections: Liberia: Events 1971-2000, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/globalconnections/liberia/timeline/time4.html>
- 389 Abuja Agreement to Supplement the Cotonou and Akosombo Agreements as subsequently clarified by the Accra Agreement, National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)-United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO-K)-Liberia Peace Council (LPC)-Armed Forces of Liberia (AFI)-United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO-J)-Lofa Defence Force (LDF)-National Patriotic Front of Liberia Central Revolutionary Council (NPFL-CRC)-Liberia National Conference (LNC), Part II (A)(i), Aug. 19, 1995, [http://www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/liberia\\_08191995.html](http://www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/liberia_08191995.html).
- 390 The Secretary General, *Twelfth Progress Report*, *supra* note 374, ¶¶ 9-10; *Liberia: A Chronology of 25 Years of Conflict and Turmoil*, IRIN NEWS, Jan. 17, 2006, <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=57838> (last visited Apr. 21, 2009).
- 391 *See* ELLIS, *supra* note 1, at 107.
- 392 Sesay, *supra* note 363, at 24.
- 393 Samuel K. Woods, II, *Statement on Development in the Peace Process*, Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, Apr. 3, 1996, *partial text* <http://africaaction.org/docs96/lib9604.2.htm>.
- 394 *See* ELLIS, *supra* note 1, at 107.
- 395 ADEKEYE ADEBAJO, BUILDING PEACE IN WEST AFRICA: LIBERIA, SIERRA LEONE, AND GUINEA-BISSAU 60-61 (2002) [hereinafter ADEBAJO, BUILDING PEACE].
- 396 Woods, II, *supra* note 393.
- 397 ADEBAJO, LIBERIA'S CIVIL WAR, *supra* note 298, at 185.
- 398 ADEBAJO, BUILDING PEACE, *supra* note 395, at 61.
- 399 *See* ELLIS, *supra* note 1, at 107.
- 400 *See id.* at 108.
- 401 Global Connections: Liberia, Events, *supra* note 388.
- 402 Amnesty Int'l, *Liberia: Action Must Be Taken Now to Protect Lives of Civilians Threatened by Armed Conflict*, AI Index: AFR 34/01/1996, Apr. 12, 1996, <http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR340011996>.
- 403 *See* ELLIS, *supra* note 1, at 108.
- 404 Global Connections: Liberia, Events, *supra* note

- 388.; ADEBAJO, BUILDING PEACE, *supra* note 395, at 61-62.
- 405 ELLIS, *supra* note 1, at 108.
- 406 Global Connections: Liberia, Events, *supra* note 388.
- 407 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 41.
- 408 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1734.
- 409 *Id.*
- 410 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 69.
- 411 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 86.
- 412 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 306.
- 413 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 541.
- 414 *See, e.g.*, TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 37, 1352, 1551.
- 415 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1352.
- 416 *See, e.g.*, TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 1513, 69 (describing how NPFL rebels targeted Krahn and NPDL members).
- 417 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 120.
- 418 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1656.
- 419 *See* Chapter 13 for more information about the refugee experience.
- 420 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1734.
- 421 TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 40, 182.
- 422 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 182.
- 423 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 40.
- 424 A Liberian woman explained that she stayed at the compound for one month, because “Krahn people were being singled out and killed around the city.” TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1467. *See* Chapter 13 for more information about the refugee experience.
- 425 TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 1375 (describing how everyone lived at the dormitory in the embassy), 1467 (describing how Liberians had to stay outside).
- 426 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1467.
- 427 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1375.
- 428 *Id.*
- 429 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1467.
- 430 TRC Diaspora Statement Recs. 1375, 1467.
- 431 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1467.
- 432 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 617.
- 433 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 707.
- 434 ADEBAJO, LIBERIA’S CIVIL WAR, *supra* note 298, at 189.
- 435 *Id.*; *Liberia Truce Fails, Bullets Fly*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Apr. 30, 1996, at 1; *Fighting Resumes in Liberia*, GUARDIAN, Apr. 30, 1996, at 10.
- 436 The Secretary General, *Seventeenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia*, at 5, U.N. Doc. S/1996/362 (May 21, 1996).
- 437 *Id.*
- 438 Supplement to the Abuja Accord, Aug. 17, 1996, <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/liberia/abuja-accord-supplement.php>; Human Rights Watch, *Emerging from the Destruction - Human Rights Challenges Facing the New Liberian Government*, Oct. 1, 1997, [hereinafter *Emerging from the Destruction*], <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1997/liberia/>; Global Connections: Liberia, Events, *supra* note 388.
- 439 Terrence Lyons, *Liberia’s Path from Anarchy to Elections*, 97 CURRENT HIST. 229, 230 (May 1998).
- 440 *Emerging from the Destruction*, *supra* note 438; Liberia: UNOMIL Background, [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unomilFT.htm#DECEMBER](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unomilFT.htm#DECEMBER) (last visited Apr. 21, 2009).
- 441 Lyons, *supra* note 439, at 231.
- 442 *Id.*
- 443 *Id.*; Carl Ek, Cong. Research Service, *Liberia: Issues for the United States* (Nov. 21, 1996), <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/96-025.htm>.
- 444 *See* Levi Woodward, *Taylor’s Liberia and the U.N.’s Involvement*, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 923, 931 (2003).
- 445 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1401.
- 446 U.S. Dep’t of State, Background Note: Liberia, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6618.htm> (last visited Oct. 22, 2008); *see also* Global Security, *Liberia – First Civil War – 1989 -1996*, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/liberia-1989.htm> (last visited Oct. 22, 2008).
- 447 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 37.

